LOVING ET UX. v. VIRGINIA
No. 395
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
388 U.S. 1; 87 S. Ct. 1817; 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010; 1967 U.S.
LEXIS 1082
April 10, 1967, Argued
June 12, 1967, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA.
DISPOSITION:
206 Va. 924, 147 S. E. 2d 78, reversed.
SUMMARY:
The issue presented in the instant case concerned the validity of the
Virginia antimiscegenation statutes, the central features of which are the
absolute prohibition of a "white person" marrying any person other than a "white
person."
A husband, a "white person," and his wife, a "colored person," within the
meanings given those terms by a Virginia statute, both residents of Virginia,
were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws, and shortly
thereafter returned to Virginia, where, upon their plea of guilty, they were
sentenced, in a Virginia state court, to one year in jail for violating Virginia
's ban on interracial marriages. Their motion to vacate the sentences on the
ground of the unconstitutionality of these statutes was denied by the trial
court. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. (206 Va 924, 147 SE2d
78.)
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction. In
an opinion by Warren, Ch. J., expressing the view of eight members of the court,
it was held that the Virginia statutes violated both the equal protection and
the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Stewart, J., concurred in the judgment on the ground that a state law making
the criminality of an act depend upon the race of the actor is invalid.
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES: [***HN1]
CIVIL RIGHTS §4.5
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §528.5
miscegenation statutes --
Headnote: [1A] [1B]
A state statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the
basis of racial classification violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause and its due process clause, which guarantees the freedom to
marry.
[***HN2]
MARRIAGE §2
state regulation --
Headnote: [2]
While marriage is a social relation subject to the state's police power, such
power is limited by the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[***HN3]
CIVIL RIGHTS §4.5
miscegenation statute -- analysis --
Headnote: [3]
The mere fact of equal application of a miscegenation statute to whites and
Negroes does not mean that the Supreme Court's analysis of the statute should
follow the approach the court has taken in cases involving no racial
discrimination; the fact of equal application does not immunize a statute
containing racial classifications from the very heavy burden of justification
which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes
drawn according to race.
[***HN4]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §17
Fourteenth Amendment -- history --
Headnote: [4]
Although the legislative history as to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment
casts some light on its construction, statements made by the framers of the
amendment are not sufficient to resolve a problem of racial discrimination, and
at best they are inconclusive.
[***HN5]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §317
classification --
Headnote: [5]
The equal protection clause requires the consideration of whether the
classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious
discrimination.
[***HN6]
CIVIL RIGHTS §4.5
Fourteenth Amendment -- purpose --
Headnote: [6]
The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to eliminate all
official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the states.
[***HN7]
CIVIL RIGHTS §4.5
distinctions because of ancestry --
Headnote: [7]
Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are odious to a
free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.
[***HN8]
CIVIL RIGHTS §4.5
equal protection -- racial classifications --
Headnote: [8]
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that racial
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the
most rigid scrutiny, and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.
[***HN9]
CIVIL RIGHTS §4.5
racial discrimination --
Headnote: [9]
The Supreme Court has consistently denied the constitutionality of measures
which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race; restricting the
freedom to marry solely because of racial classification violates the central
meaning of the equal protection clause.
[***HN10]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §525
liberty to marry --
Headnote: [10]
The freedom to marry is one of the vital personal rights protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as essential to the orderly pursuit
of happiness by free men.
[***HN11]
MARRIAGE §1
basic right --
Headnote: [11]
Marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very
existence and survival.
[***HN12]
CIVIL RIGHTS §4.5
marriage -- freedom of choice --
Headnote: [12]
The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be
restricted by invidious racial discriminations; the freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be
infringed by the state.
SYLLABUS:
Virginia's statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on
the basis of racial classifications held to violate the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 4-12.
COUNSEL:
Bernard S. Cohen and Philip J. Hirschkop argued the cause and filed a brief
for appellants. Mr. Hirschkop argued pro hac vice, by special leave of Court.
R. D. McIlwaine III, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause
for appellee. With him on the brief were Robert Y. Button, Attorney General,
and Kenneth C. Patty, Assistant Attorney General.
William M. Marutani, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the
Japanese American Citizens League, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging reversal, were filed by William M. Lewers and
William B. Ball for the National Catholic Conference for Interracial Justice et
al.; by Robert L. Carter and Andrew D. Weinberger for the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People, and by Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit
III and Michael Meltsner for the N. A. A. C. P. Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, Inc.
T. W. Bruton, Attorney General, and Ralph Moody, Deputy Attorney General,
filed a brief for the State of North Carolina, as amicus curiae, urging
affirmance.
JUDGES:
Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas
OPINIONBY:
WARREN
OPINION:
[*2] [***1012] [**1818] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion
of the Court.
[***HR1A] This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this
Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent
marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. n1 For
reasons [**1819] which seem to us to reflect the central meaning of those
constitutional commands, we conclude that these statutes cannot stand
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
"
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
In June 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and
Richard Loving, a white [***1013] man, were married in the District of
Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings
returned to Virginia and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At
the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court [*3] of Caroline County, a grand
jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on
interracial marriages. On January 6, 1959, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the
charge and were sentenced to one year in jail; however, the trial judge
suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the
Lovings leave the State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He
stated in an opinion that:
"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."
After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of
Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a motion in the state trial court to
vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes
which they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion
not having been decided by October 28, 1964, the Lovings instituted a class
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia
antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional and to enjoin state officials from
enforcing their convictions. On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied
the motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. On February 11, 1965, the three-judge
District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their
constitutional claims to the highest state court.
The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the
antimiscegenation statutes and, after [*4] modifying the sentence, affirmed
the convictions. n2 The Lovings appealed this decision, and we noted probable
jurisdiction on December 12, 1966, 385 U.S. 986.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 206 Va. 924, 147 S. E. 2d 78 (1966).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part
of a comprehensive statutory scheme aimed at prohibiting and punishing
interracial marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 20-58 of the
Virginia Code:
"Leaving State to evade law. -- If any white person and colored person shall
go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with the intention
of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in
it, cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59,
and the marriage shall be governed by the same law as if it had been solemnized
in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be
evidence of their marriage."
Section 20-59, which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:
"Punishment for marriage. -- If any white person intermarry with a colored
person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty
of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary [**1820]
for not less than one nor more than five years."
[***1014] Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are §
20-57, which automatically voids all marriages between "a white person and a
colored person" without any judicial proceeding, n3 and §§ 20-54 and 1-14 which,
[*5] respectively, define "white persons" and "colored persons and Indians" for
purposes of the statutory prohibitions. n4 The Lovings have never disputed in
the course of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a "colored person" or that Mr.
Loving is a "white person" within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia
statutes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 Section 20-57 of the Virginia Code provides:
"Marriages void without decree. -- All marriages between a white person and a
colored person shall be absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other
legal process." Va. Code Ann. § 20-57 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
n4 Section 20-54 of the Virginia Code provides:
"Intermarriage prohibited; meaning of term 'white persons.' -- It shall
hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a
white person, or a person with no other admixture of blood than white and
American Indian. For the purpose of this chapter, the term 'white person' shall
apply only to such person as has no trace whatever of any blood other than
Caucasian; but persons who have one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the
American Indian and have no other non-Caucasic blood shall be deemed to be white
persons. All laws heretofore passed and now in effect regarding the
intermarriage of white and colored persons shall apply to marriages prohibited
by this chapter." Va. Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
The exception for persons with less than one-sixteenth "of the blood of the
American Indian" is apparently accounted for, in the words of a tract issued by
the Registrar of the State Bureau of Vital Statistics, by "the desire of all to
recognize as an integral and honored part of the white race the descendants of
John Rolfe and Pocahontas . . . ." Plecker, The New Family and Race Improvement,
17 Va. Health Bull., Extra No. 12, at 25-26 (New Family Series No. 5, 1925),
cited in Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia's Anti-Miscegenation Statute in
Historical Perspective, 52 Va. L. Rev. 1189, 1202, n. 93 (1966).
Section 1-14 of the Virginia Code provides:
"Colored persons and Indians defined. -- Every person in whom there is
ascertainable any Negro blood shall be deemed and taken to be a colored person,
and every person not a colored person having one fourth or more of American
Indian blood shall be deemed an American Indian; except that members of Indian
tribes existing in this Commonwealth having one fourth or more of Indian blood
and less than one sixteenth of Negro blood shall be deemed tribal Indians." Va.
Code Ann. § 1-14 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*6] Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages
on the basis of racial classifications. n5 Penalties [**1821] for
miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery and have been common in Virginia
since the colonial [***1015] period. n6 The present statutory scheme dates
from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed during the period
of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central
features of this Act, and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of
a "white person" marrying other than another "white person," n7 a prohibition
against issuing marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that
[*7] the applicants' statements as to their race are correct, n8 certificates
of "racial composition" to be kept by both local and state registrars, n9 and
the carrying forward of earlier prohibitions against racial intermarriage. n10
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5 After the initiation of this litigation, Maryland repealed its
prohibitions against interracial marriage, Md. Laws 1967, c. 6, leaving Virginia
and 15 other States with statutes outlawing interracial marriage: Alabama, Ala.
Const., Art. 4, § 102, Ala. Code, Tit. 14, § 360 (1958); Arkansas, Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 55-104 (1947); Delaware, Del. Code Ann., Tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Florida,
Fla. Const., Art. 16, § 24, Fla. Stat. § 741.11 (1965); Georgia, Ga. Code Ann. §
53-106 (1961); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020 (Supp. 1966); Louisiana,
La. Rev. Stat. § 14:79 (1950); Mississippi, Miss. Const., Art. 14, § 263, Miss.
Code Ann. § 459 (1956); Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (Supp. 1966); North
Carolina, N. C. Const., Art. XIV, § 8, N. C. Gen. Stat. § 14-181 (1953);
Oklahoma, Okla. Stat., Tit. 43, § 12 (Supp. 1965); South Carolina, S. C. Const.,
Art. 3, § 33, S. C. Code Ann. § 20-7 (1962); Tennessee, Tenn. Const., Art. 11, §
14, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-402 (1955); Texas, Tex. Pen. Code, Art. 492 (1952);
West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. § 4697 (1961).
Over the past 15 years, 14 States have repealed laws outlawing interracial
marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
The first state court to recognize that miscegenation statutes violate the
Equal Protection Clause was the Supreme Court of California. Perez v. Sharp, 32
Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
n6 For a historical discussion of Virginia's miscegenation statutes, see
Wadlington, supra, n. 4.
n7 Va. Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
n8 Va. Code Ann. § 20-53 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
n9 Va. Code Ann. § 20-50 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
n10 Va. Code Ann. § 20-54 (1960 Repl. Vol.).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
I.
In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision below,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia referred to its 1955 decision in Naim
v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S. E. 2d 749, as stating the reasons supporting the
validity of these laws. In Naim, the state court concluded that the State's
legitimate purposes were "to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens," and
to prevent "the corruption of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens," and "the
obliteration of racial pride," obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White
Supremacy. Id., at 90, 87 S. E. 2d, at 756. The court also reasoned that
marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal
intervention, and, consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to
exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.
[***HR2] While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage
is a social relation subject to the State's police power, Maynard v. Hill, 125
U.S. 190 (1888), the State does not contend in its argument before this Court
that its powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could it do so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Instead, the
State argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by
the statements of the Framers, is only that state penal laws containing an
interracial element [*8] as part of the definition of the offense must apply
equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each race are
punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because its
miscegenation statutes punish equally both the white and the Negro participants
in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial
classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race.
The second argument advanced by the State assumes the validity of its equal
application theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does
not outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on racial
classifications, the question of constitutionality would thus become whether
there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial marriages
differently from other marriages. On this question, the State argues, [***1016]
the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently, this Court
should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of
discouraging interracial marriages.
[**1822]
[***HR3] Because we reject the notion that the mere "equal application" of a
statute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the
classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious
racial discriminations, we do not accept the State's contention that these
statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for concluding that
they serve a rational purpose. The mere fact of equal application does not mean
that our analysis of these statutes should follow the approach we have taken in
cases involving no racial discrimination where the Equal Protection Clause has
been arrayed against a statute discriminating between the kinds of advertising
which may be displayed on trucks in New York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc.
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949), or an exemption in Ohio's ad valorem tax for
merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage warehouse, Allied Stores of
Ohio, [*9] Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959). In these cases, involving
distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has merely asked whether
there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to
the wisdom of the state legislatures. In the case at bar, however, we deal with
statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of equal application
does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which
the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn
according to race.
[***HR4] The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about
the time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the Framers
did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation laws.
Many of the statements alluded to by the State concern the debates over the
Freedmen's Bureau Bill, which President Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted over his veto. While these statements have some
relevance to the intention of Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment,
it must be understood that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes
and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. As for
the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have
said in connection with a related problem, that although these historical
sources "cast some light" they are not sufficient to resolve the problem; "[at]
best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War
Amendments undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among 'all
persons born or naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents, just as
certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments
and wished them to have the most limited effect." Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954). See also Strauder [*10] v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 310 (1880). We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the
Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State, that the requirement of
equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based
on racial classifications [***1017] so long as white and Negro participants in
the offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
[***HR5] [***HR6] The State finds support for its "equal application" theory
in the decision of the Court in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883). In that
case, the Court upheld a conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery
or fornication between a white person and a Negro which imposed a greater
penalty than that of a statute proscribing similar conduct by members of the
same race. The Court reasoned [**1823] that the statute could not be said to
discriminate against Negroes because the punishment for each participant in the
offense was the same. However, as recently as the 1964 Term, in rejecting the
reasoning of that case, we stated "Pace represents a limited view of the Equal
Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions
of this Court." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 188. As we there demonstrated,
the Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the
classifications drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious
discrimination. The clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71 (1873); Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-308 (1880); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-345
(1880); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
[*11]
[***HR7] [***HR8] There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation
statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statutes
proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different
races. Over the years, this Court has consistently repudiated "distinctions
between citizens solely because of their ancestry" as being "odious to a free
people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). At the very least, the
Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications, especially suspect
in criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and, if they are ever to be upheld,
they must be shown to be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible
state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this
Court have already stated that they "cannot conceive of a valid legislative
purpose . . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his
conduct is a criminal offense." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 198 (STEWART,
J., joined by DOUGLAS, J., concurring).
[***HR9] There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact
that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own
justification, as measures designed [***1018] to maintain White Supremacy. n11
We have consistently denied [*12] the constitutionality of measures which
restrict the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n11 Appellants point out that the State's concern in these statutes, as
expressed in the words of the 1924 Act's title, "An Act to Preserve Racial
Integrity," extends only to the integrity of the white race. While Virginia
prohibits whites from marrying any nonwhite (subject to the exception for the
descendants of Pocahontas), Negroes, Orientals, and any other racial class may
intermarry without statutory interference. Appellants contend that this
distinction renders Virginia's miscegenation statutes arbitrary and unreasonable
even assuming the constitutional validity of an official purpose to preserve
"racial integrity." We need not reach this contention because we find the racial
classifications in these statutes repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment, even
assuming an even-handed state purpose to protect the "integrity" of all races.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
II.
[**1824]
[***HR10] These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
[***HR1B] [***HR11] [***HR12] Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights
of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888). To deny
this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly
subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due
process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to
marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.
These convictions must be reversed.
It is so ordered.
CONCUR:
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concurring.
I have previously expressed the belief that "it is simply not possible for
a state law to be valid under our Constitution which makes the criminality
of an act depend upon the race of the actor." McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 198 (concurring opinion). Because I adhere to that belief,
I concur in the judgment of the Court.