HILLARY GOODRIDGE & others n1 vs. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH & another. n2
n1 Julie Goodridge, David Wilson, Robert Compton, Michael
Horgan, Edward Balmelli, Maureen Brodoff, Ellen Wade, Gary
Chalmers, Richard Linnell, Heidi Norton, Gina Smith, Gloria
Bailey, and Linda Davies.n2 Commissioner of Public Health.
SJC-08860
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS
440 Mass. 309; 798 N.E.2d 941; 2003 Mass. LEXIS 814
March 4, 2003, Argued
November 18, 2003, Decided
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: [***1] As Corrected December 4, 2003. Related proceeding
at Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 2004 Mass. LEXIS 35 (Mass., Feb. 3,
2004)
PRIOR HISTORY: Suffolk. Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department
on April 11, 2001. The case was heard by Thomas E. Connolly, J., on motions for
summary judgment. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct
appellate review.
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 2002 Mass. Super. LEXIS 153 (Mass. Super.
Ct., 2002)
DISPOSITION: Superior court's grant of summary judgment for the Department of
Public Health vacated; case remanded to superior court for entry of judgment for
the plaintiffs. Entry of judgment to be stayed for 180 days to permit
Massachusetts Legislature the opportunity to take any action deemed necessary in
light of this opinion.
HEADNOTES: License. Marriage. Statute, Construction. Constitutional Law, Police
power, Equal protection of laws. Due Process of Law, Marriage. Words, "Marriage.
"
COUNSEL: Mary Lisa Bonauto (Gary D. Buseck with her) for Hillary Goodridge.
Judith S. Yogman, Assistant Attorney General, for Department of Public Health.
The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:.
Joseph P.J. Vrabel, Mark D. Mason, & Martin W. Healy for Massachusetts Bar
Association.
Leslie Cooper & James D. Esseks, of New York, Jon W. Davidson & Shannon Minter,
of California, Elliot M. Mincberg & Judith E. Schaeffer, of the District of
Columbia, & John Reinstein, Sarah R. Wunsch, Paul Holtzman, & Hugh Dun Rappaport
for Urban League of Eastern Massachusetts & others.
Paul Benjamin Linton, of Illinois, & Thomas M. Harvey for Robert J. Araujo &
others.
Dwight G. Duncan for Massachusetts Family Institute, Inc., & others.
Glen Lavy, of Arizona, Stephen W. Reed, of California, & Bertin C. Emmons for
National Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality, Inc., & others.
Robert W. Ash & Vincent P. McCarthy, [***2] of Connecticut, & Philip E. Cleary
for The Common Good Foundation & others.
Don Stenberg, Attorney General of Nebraska, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General
of Utah, Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General of Utah, & Mark Barnett,
Attorney General of South Dakota, for the State of Utah & others.
Chester Darling & Michael Williams for Massachusetts Citizens Alliance &
another.
Daniel Avila for The Catholic Action League of Massachusetts.
Joshua K. Baker, of California, & Robert G. Caprera for Jose Martin de Agar &
others.
Wendy J. Herdlein, of California, & James R. Knudsen for the Honorable Philip
Travis & others.
Steven W. Fitschen, of Virginia, for The National Legal Foundation.
Jeffrey A. Shafer & David R. Langdon, of Ohio, William C. Duncan, of Utah, &
Wendy J. Herdlein, of California, for Marriage Law Project.
Lisa Rae, Kenneth Elmore, Arthur Berney, & Josephine Ross for The Religious
Coalition for the Freedom to Marry & others.
Ann DiMaria for The Ethics & Religious Liberty Commission & others.
Anthony Mirenda, Vickie L. Henry, Lucy Fowler, John M. Granberry, Rachel N.
Lessem, & Gabriel M. Helmer for Robert F. Williams & others. [***3]
Kenneth J. Parsigian for Peter W. Bardaglio & others.
David Cruz, of New York, John Taylor Williams, Carol V. Rose, Debra Squires-Lee,
Christopher Morrison, & Marni Goldstein Caputo for William E. Adams & others.
Martin J. Newhouse & Katharine Bolland for Coalition gaie et lesbienne du Quebec
& others.
Joseph Ureneck, Pro se.
Teresa S. Collett, of Texas, & Luke Stanton for Free Market Foundation.
Peter F. Zupcofska, L. Tracee Whitley, Heidi A. Nadel, & Corin R. Swift for
Boston Bar Association & another.
Mary Jo Johnson, Jonathan A. Shapiro, & Amy L. Nash for The Massachusetts
Psychiatric Society & others.
Tony R. Maida, Nina Joan Kimball, & Justine H. Brousseau for Libby Adler &
others.
Daryl J. Lapp, Kevin D. Batt, & Katharine Silbaugh for Monroe Inker & another.
David Zwiebel, Mordechai Biser, & Nathan J. Diament, of New York, & Abba Cohen,
of the District of Columbia, for Agudath Israel of America & others.
JUDGES: Present: Marshall, C.J., Greaney, Ireland, Spina, Cowin, Sosman, &
Cordy, JJ.
OPINIONBY: MARSHALL
OPINION: [*312] [**948] MARSHALL, C.J. Marriage is a vital social
institution. The exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures
love and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For those who
choose to marry, and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of
legal, financial, and social benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal,
financial, and social obligations. The question before us is whether, consistent
with the Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the protections,
benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the
same sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. The Massachusetts
Constitution affirms the dignity and equality of all individuals. It forbids the
creation of second-class citizens. In reaching our conclusion we have given full
deference to the arguments made by the Commonwealth. But it has failed to
identify any constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to
same-sex couples.
We are mindful that our decision marks a change in the history of our marriage
law. Many people hold deep-seated religious, [***5] moral, and ethical
convictions that marriage should be limited to the union of one man and one
woman, and that homosexual conduct is immoral. Many hold equally strong
religious, moral, and ethical convictions that same-sex couples are entitled to
be married, and that homosexual persons should be treated no differently than
their heterosexual neighbors. Neither view answers the question before us. Our
concern is with the Massachusetts Constitution as a charter of governance for
every person properly within its reach. "Our obligation is to define the liberty
of all, not to mandate our own moral code." Lawrence v. Texas, 156 L. Ed. 2d
508, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2480 (2003) (Lawrence), quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
Whether the Commonwealth may use its formidable regulatory authority to
bar same-sex couples from civil marriage is a question not previously addressed
by a Massachusetts appellate court. n3 It is a question the United States
Supreme Court left open as a matter of Federal law in Lawrence, supra at 2484,
where it was not an issue. There, the [***6] Court affirmed that the core
concept of common human dignity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution precludes government intrusion into the deeply
personal realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy and one's choice of
an intimate partner. The Court also reaffirmed the central role that decisions
whether to marry or have children bear in shaping one's identity. Id. at 2481.
The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of individual
liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution; it [**949] may demand
broader protection for fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of government
intrusion into the protected spheres of private life.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 For American appellate courts that have recently addressed this issue, see
Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Dean v.
District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852
P.2d 44 (1993); Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 242, 744 A.2d 864 (1999). Earlier
cases include Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 673
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1111, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1373, 102 S. Ct.
3494 (1982); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v.
Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810, 34
L. Ed. 2d 65, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn. App. 247, 522 P.2d
1187 (1974). See also Halpern v. Toronto (City), 172 O.A.C. 276 (2003); Egale
Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 (2003).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***7]
Barred access to the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage, a
person who enters into an intimate, exclusive union with another of the same sex
is arbitrarily deprived of membership in one of our community's most rewarding
and cherished institutions. That exclusion is incompatible with the
constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and equality under
law.
I
The plaintiffs are fourteen individuals from five Massachusetts counties. As of
April 11, 2001, the date they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs Gloria
Bailey, sixty years old, and Linda Davies, fifty-five years old, had been in a
committed relationship for thirty years; the plaintiffs Maureen Brodoff,
forty-nine years old, and Ellen Wade, fifty-two years old, had been in a
committed [*314] relationship for twenty years and lived with their twelve
year old daughter; the plaintiffs Hillary Goodridge, forty-four years old, and
Julie Goodridge, forty-three years old, had been in a committed relationship for
thirteen years and lived with their five year old daughter; the plaintiffs Gary
Chalmers, thirty-five years old, and Richard Linnell, thirty-seven years old,
had been in a committed relationship [***8] for thirteen years and lived with
their eight year old daughter and Richard's mother; the plaintiffs Heidi Norton,
thirty-six years old, and Gina Smith, thirty-six years old, had been in a
committed relationship for eleven years and lived with their two sons, ages five
years and one year; the plaintiffs Michael Horgan, forty-one years old, and
Edward Balmelli, forty-one years old, had been in a committed relationship for
seven years; and the plaintiffs David Wilson, fifty-seven years old, and Robert
Compton, fifty-one years old, had been in a committed relationship for four
years and had cared for David's mother in their home after a serious illness
until she died.
The plaintiffs include business executives, lawyers, an investment banker,
educators, therapists, and a computer engineer. Many are active in church,
community, and school groups. They have employed such legal means as are
available to them -- for example, joint adoption, powers of attorney, and joint
ownership of real property -- to secure aspects of their relationships. Each
plaintiff attests a desire to marry his or her partner in order to affirm
publicly their commitment to each other and to secure the legal protections
[***9] and benefits afforded to married couples and their children.
The Department of Public Health (department) is charged by statute with
safeguarding public health. See G. L. c. 17. Among its responsibilities, the
department oversees the registry of vital records and statistics (registry),
which "enforces all laws" relative to the issuance of marriage licenses and the
keeping of marriage records, see G. L. c. 17, § 4, and which promulgates
policies and procedures for the issuance of marriage licenses by city and town
clerks and registers. See, e.g., G. L. c. 207, §§ 20, 28A, and 37. The registry
is headed by a registrar of vital records and statistics (registrar), appointed
by the Commissioner of Public Health (commissioner) with the approval of the
public health council and supervised by the commissioner. See G. L. c. 17, § 4.
[*315] In March and April, 2001, each of the plaintiff couples attempted to
obtain a marriage license from a city or town clerk's office. As required under
G. L. c. 207, they completed notices of intention to marry on forms provided by
the registry, [***10] [**950] see G. L. c. 207, § 20, and presented these
forms to a Massachusetts town or city clerk, together with the required health
forms and marriage license fees. See G. L. c. 207, § 19. In each case, the clerk
either refused to accept the notice of intention to marry or denied a marriage
license to the couple on the ground that Massachusetts does not recognize
same-sex marriage. n4, n5 Because obtaining a marriage license is a necessary
prerequisite to civil marriage in Massachusetts, denying marriage licenses to
the plaintiffs was tantamount to denying them access to civil marriage itself,
with its appurtenant social and legal protections, benefits, and obligations. n6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 General Laws c. 207, § 37, provides: "The commissioner of public health shall
furnish to the clerk or registrar of every town a printed list of all legal
impediments to marriage, and the clerk or registrar shall forthwith post and
thereafter maintain it in a conspicuous place in his office." The record does
not reveal whether any of the clerks' offices that considered the plaintiffs'
applications for a marriage license had posted such a list of impediments, or
whether such list included as an impediment that the applicants are of the same
sex. [***11]
n5 The plaintiffs alleged that they met all of the facial qualifications to
obtain marriage licenses pursuant to G. L. c. 207, and the department does not
contest this assertion.n6 The complaint alleged various circumstances in which
the absence of the full legal protections of civil marriage has harmed them and
their children. For example, Hillary and Julie Goodridge alleged that, when
Julie gave birth to their daughter (whom Hillary subsequently coadopted) during
a delivery that required the infant's transfer to neonatal intensive care,
Hillary "had difficulty gaining access to Julie and their newborn daughter at
the hospital"; Gary Chalmers and Richard Linnell alleged that "Gary pays for a
family health insurance policy at work which covers only him and their daughter
because Massachusetts law does not consider Rich to be a 'dependent.' This means
that their household must purchase a separate individual policy of health
insurance for Rich at considerable expense. . . . Gary has a pension plan at
work, but under state law, because he is a municipal employee, that plan does
not allow him the same range of options in providing for his beneficiary that a
married spouse has and thus he cannot provide the same security to his family
that a married person could if he should predecease Rich."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***12]
On April 11, 2001, the plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court against the
department and the commissioner seeking a judgment that "the exclusion of the
plaintiff couples and other [*316] qualified same-sex couples from access to
marriage licenses, and the legal and social status of civil marriage, as well as
the protections, benefits and obligations of marriage, violates Massachusetts
law." See G. L. c. 231A. The plaintiffs alleged violation of the laws of the
Commonwealth, including but not limited to their rights under arts. 1, 6, 7, 10,
12, and 16, and Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, of the Massachusetts Constitution.
n7, n8
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n7 Article 1, as amended by art. 106 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts
Constitution, provides: "All people are born free and equal and have certain
natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their
safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged
because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin."
Article 6 provides: "No man, nor corporation, or association of men, have any
other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges,
distinct from those of the community, than what arises from the consideration of
services rendered to the public . . . ."
Article 7 provides: "Government is instituted for the common good; for the
protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not for the
profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family or class of men:
Therefore the people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible
right to institute government; and to reform, alter, or totally change the same,
when their protection, safety, prosperity and happiness require it."
Article 10 provides, in relevant part: "Each individual of the society has a
right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property,
according to standing laws . . . ."
Article 12 provides, in relevant part: "No subject shall be . . . deprived of
his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law .
. . or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his
peers, or the law of the land."
Article 16, as amended by art. 77 of the Amendments, provides, in relevant part:
"The right of free speech shall not be abridged." Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4, as
amended by art. 112, provides, in pertinent part, that "full power and authority
are hereby given and granted to the said general court, from time to time, to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws,
statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions, either with penalties or
without; so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this Commonwealth." [***13]
n8 The department claims that the plaintiffs have waived their art. 12 and art.
16 claims on appeal. Because our holding today does not turn on art. 12 or art.
16, we do not consider the department's waiver argument.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The department, represented by the Attorney General, admitted to a policy
and practice of denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples. It denied
that its actions violated any law or that the plaintiffs were entitled
to relief. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
A Superior Court judge ruled for the department. In a memorandum of decision
and order dated May 7, 2002, he dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the
marriage statutes should be construed to permit marriage between persons
of the same sex, holding that the plain wording of G. L. c. 207, as well
as the wording of other marriage statutes, precluded that interpretation.
Turning to the constitutional claims, he held that the marriage exclusion
does not offend the liberty, freedom, equality, or due process provisions
of the Massachusetts Constitution, and that the Massachusetts Declaration
of Rights does not guarantee "the fundamental right to marry a person of
the same sex." He concluded that prohibiting same-sex marriage rationally
furthers the Legislature's legitimate interest in safeguarding the "primary
purpose" of marriage, "procreation". The Legislature may rationally limit
marriage to opposite-sex couples, he concluded, because those couples are
"theoretically . . . capable of procreation", they do not rely on
"inherently more cumbersome" noncoital means of reproduction, and they
are more likely than same-sex couples to have children, or more children.
After the complaint was dismissed and summary judgment entered for the
defendants, the plaintiffs appealed. Both parties requested direct appellate
review, which we granted.
II
Although the plaintiffs refer in passing to "the marriage statutes," they focus,
quite properly, on G. L. c. 207, the marriage licensing statute, which controls
entry into civil marriage. As a preliminary matter, we summarize the provisions
of that law.
General Laws c. 207 is both a gatekeeping and a public records statute. It sets
minimum qualifications for obtaining a marriage license and directs city and
town clerks, the registrar, and the department [***15] to keep and maintain
certain "vital records" of civil marriages. The gatekeeping provisions of G. L.
c. 207 are minimal. They forbid marriage of individuals within certain [*318]
degrees of consanguinity, §§ 1 and 2, and polygamous marriages. See G. L. c.
207, § 4. See also G. L. c. 207, § 8 (marriages solemnized in violation of §§ 1,
2, and 4, are void ab initio). They prohibit marriage if one of the parties has
communicable [**952] syphilis, see G. L. c. 207, § 28A, and restrict the
circumstances in which a person under eighteen years of age may marry. See G. L.
c. 207, §§ 7, 25, and 27. The statute requires that civil marriage be solemnized
only by those so authorized. See G. L. c. 207, §§ 38-40.
The record-keeping provisions of G. L. c. 207 are more extensive. Marriage
applicants file standard information forms and a medical certificate in any
Massachusetts city or town clerk's office and tender a filing fee. G. L. c. 207,
§§ 19-20, 28A. The clerk issues the marriage [***16] license, and when the
marriage is solemnized, the individual authorized to solemnize the marriage adds
additional information to the form and returns it (or a copy) to the clerk's
office. G. L. c. 207, §§ 28, 30, 38-40 (this completed form is commonly known as
the "marriage certificate"). The clerk sends a copy of the information to the
registrar, and that information becomes a public record. See G. L. c. 17, § 4;
G. L. c. 66, § 10. n9, n10
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n9 The marital forms forwarded by the clerk or register must contain the "date
of record, date and place of marriage, name, residence and official station of
the person by whom solemnized; for each of the parties to be married the name,
date and place of birth, residence, age, number of the marriage, as first or
second, and if previously married, whether widowed or divorced, and the
birth-given names of their parents." G. L. c. 46, § 1.n10 "The record of a
marriage made and kept as provided by law by the person by whom the marriage was
solemnized, or by the clerk or registrar, or a copy thereof duly certified,
shall be prima facie evidence of such marriage." G. L. c. 207, § 45. A
"certificate of the commissioner's copy, signed by the commissioner or the
registrar, is admissible as evidence of the record." Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 181-182, 366 N.E.2d 717
(1977).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***17]
In short, for all the joy and solemnity that normally attend a marriage, G. L.
c. 207, governing entrance to marriage, is a licensing law. The plaintiffs argue
that because nothing in that licensing law specifically prohibits marriages
between persons of the same sex, we may interpret the statute to permit
"qualified same sex couples" to obtain marriage licenses, thereby avoiding the
question whether the law is constitutional. See [*319] School Comm. of
Greenfield v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 79, 431 N.E.2d 180 (1982),
and cases cited. This claim lacks merit.
We interpret statutes to carry out the Legislature's intent, determined by the
words of a statute interpreted according to "the ordinary and approved usage of
the language." Hanlon v. Rollins, 286 Mass. 444, 447, 190 N.E. 606 (1934). The
everyday meaning of "marriage" is "the legal union of a man and woman as husband
and wife," Black's Law Dictionary 986 (7th ed. 1999), and the plaintiffs do not
argue that the term "marriage" has ever had a different meaning under
Massachusetts law. See, e.g., Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 52 (1810)
(marriage "is an engagement, by [***18] which a single man and a single woman,
of sufficient discretion, take each other for husband and wife"). This
definition of marriage, as both the department and the Superior Court judge
point out, derives from the common law. See Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass.
530, 535 (1807) (Massachusetts common law derives from English common law except
as otherwise altered by Massachusetts statutes and Constitution). See also
Commonwealth v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 462-463 (1873) ("when the statutes are
silent, questions of the validity of marriages are to be determined by the jus
gentium, the common law of nations"); C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker, Family
Law and Practice § 1.2 (3d ed. 2002). Far from being ambiguous, the undefined
word "marriage," as [**953] used in G. L. c. 207, confirms the General Court's
intent to hew to the term's common-law and quotidian meaning concerning the
genders of the marriage partners.
The intended scope of G. L. c. 207 is also evident in its consanguinity
provisions. See Chandler v. County Comm'rs of Nantucket County, 437 Mass. 430,
435, 772 N.E.2d 578 (2002) (statute's various provisions may offer insight into
legislative [***19] intent). Sections 1 and 2 of G. L. c. 207 prohibit
marriages between a man and certain female relatives and a woman and certain
male relatives, but are silent as to the consanguinity of male-male or
female-female marriage applicants. See G. L. c. 207, §§ 1-2. The only reasonable
explanation is that the Legislature did not intend that same-sex couples be
licensed to marry. We conclude, as did the [*320] judge, that G. L. c. 207 may
not be construed to permit same-sex couples to marry. n11
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n11 We use the terms "same sex" and "opposite sex" when characterizing the
couples in question, because these terms are more accurate in this context than
the terms "homosexual" or "heterosexual," although at times we use those terms
when we consider them appropriate. Nothing in our marriage law precludes people
who identify themselves (or who are identified by others) as gay, lesbian, or
bisexual from marrying persons of the opposite sex. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw.
530, 543 n.11, 547 n.14, 852 P.2d 44 (1993).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***20]
III
A
The larger question is whether, as the department claims, government action that
bars same-sex couples from civil marriage constitutes a legitimate exercise of
the State's authority to regulate conduct, or whether, as the plaintiffs claim,
this categorical marriage exclusion violates the Massachusetts Constitution. We
have recognized the long-standing statutory understanding, derived from the
common law, that "marriage" means the lawful union of a woman and a man. But
that history cannot and does not foreclose the constitutional question.
The plaintiffs' claim that the marriage restriction violates the Massachusetts
Constitution can be analyzed in two ways. Does it offend the Constitution's
guarantees of equality before the law? Or do the liberty and due process
provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution secure the plaintiffs' right to
marry their chosen partner? In matters implicating marriage, family life, and
the upbringing of children, the two constitutional concepts frequently overlap,
as they do here. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120, 136 L. Ed. 2d
473, 117 S. Ct. 555 (1996) (noting convergence of due process and equal
protection [***21] principles in cases concerning parent-child relationships);
Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 728, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) (analyzing statutory ban
on interracial marriage as equal protection violation concerning regulation of
fundamental right). See also Lawrence, supra at 2482 ("Equality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive
guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on the
latter point advances both interests"); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 98 L.
Ed. 884, 74 S. Ct. 693 (1954) (racial [*321] segregation in District of
Columbia public schools violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the United States Constitution), decided the same day as Brown v. Board of
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 98 L. Ed. 873, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954) (holding that
segregation of public schools in the States violates the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment). Much of what we say concerning one standard
applies to the other.
[**954] We begin by considering the nature of civil marriage itself. Simply
put, the government creates civil marriage. In Massachusetts, [***22] civil
marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its name
implies: a wholly secular institution. See Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 Mass.
459, 460-466 (1879) (noting that "in Massachusetts, from very early times, the
requisites of a valid marriage have been regulated by statutes of the Colony,
Province, and Commonwealth," and surveying marriage statutes from 1639 through
1834). No religious ceremony has ever been required to validate a Massachusetts
marriage. Id.In a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage:
two willing spouses and an approving State. See DeMatteo v. DeMatteo, 436 Mass.
18, 31, 762 N.E.2d 797 (2002) ("Marriage is not a mere contract between two
parties but a legal status from which certain rights and obligations arise");
Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 409, 50 N.E. 933 (1898) (on marriage, the parties
"assume[] new relations to each other and to the State"). See also French v.
McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546, 195 N.E. 714 (1935). While only the parties can
mutually assent to marriage, the terms of the marriage -- who may marry and what
obligations, benefits, [***23] and liabilities attach to civil marriage -- are
set by the Commonwealth. Conversely, while only the parties can agree to end the
marriage (absent the death of one of them or a marriage void ab initio), the
Commonwealth defines the exit terms. See G. L. c. 208.
Civil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of the police power.
See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983)
(regulation of marriage is properly within the scope of the police power).
"Police power" (now more commonly termed the State's regulatory authority) is an
old-fashioned term for the Commonwealth's lawmaking authority, as bounded by the
liberty and equality guarantees of the [*322] Massachusetts Constitution and
its express delegation of power from the people to their government. In broad
terms, it is the Legislature's power to enact rules to regulate conduct, to the
extent that such laws are "necessary to secure the health, safety, good order,
comfort, or general welfare of the community" (citations omitted). Opinion of
the Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 785, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960). n12 See Commonwealth v.
Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 7 Cush. 53, 85 (1851). [***24]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n12 "The term public welfare has never been and cannot be precisely defined.
Sometimes it has been said to include public convenience, comfort, peace and
order, prosperity, and similar concepts, but not to include 'mere expediency.'"
Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 778, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Without question, civil marriage enhances the "welfare of the community." It is
a "social institution of the highest importance." French v. McAnarney, supra.
Civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships
over transient ones. It is central to the way the Commonwealth identifies
individuals, provides for the orderly distribution of property, ensures that
children and adults are cared for and supported whenever possible from private
rather than public funds, and tracks important epidemiological and demographic
data.
Marriage also bestows enormous private and social advantages on those who choose
to marry. Civil marriage is at once a deeply personal [***25] commitment to
another human being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality,
companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. "It is [**955] an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965). Because
it fulfils yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our
common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision
whether and whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition.
Tangible as well as intangible benefits flow from marriage. The marriage license
grants valuable property rights to those who meet the entry requirements, and
who agree to what might otherwise be a burdensome degree of government
regulation of their activities. n13 See Leduc v. Commonwealth, 421 Mass. 433,
435, 657 N.E.2d 755 (1995), [*323] cert. denied, 519 U.S. 827, 136 L. Ed. 2d
47, 117 S. Ct. 91 (1996) ("The historical aim of licensure generally is
preservation of public health, safety, and welfare by extending the public
[***26] trust only to those with proven qualifications"). The Legislature has
conferred on "each party [in a civil marriage] substantial rights concerning the
assets of the other which unmarried cohabitants do not have." Wilcox v. Trautz,
427 Mass. 326, 334, 693 N.E.2d 141 (1998). See Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass.
615, 618, 631 N.E.2d 1016 (1994) (rejecting claim for equitable distribution of
property where plaintiff cohabited with but did not marry defendant); Feliciano
v. Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142, 514 N.E.2d 1095 (1987) (government
interest in promoting marriage would be "subverted" by recognition of "a right
to recover for loss of consortium by a person who has not accepted the
correlative responsibilities of marriage"); Davis v. Misiano, 373 Mass. 261,
263, 366 N.E.2d 752 (1977) (unmarried partners not entitled to rights of
separate support or alimony). See generally Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 418 Mass.
316, 327-328, 636 N.E.2d 233 & nn. 10, 11 (1994).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n13 For example, married persons face substantial restrictions, simply because
they are married, on their ability freely to dispose of their assets. See, e.g.,
G. L. c. 208, § 34 (providing for the payment of alimony and the equitable
division of property on divorce); G. L. c. 191, § 15, and G. L. c. 189 (rights
of elective share and dower).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***27]
The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching
nearly every aspect of life and death. The department states that "hundreds of
statutes" are related to marriage and to marital benefits. With no attempt to be
comprehensive, we note that some of the statutory benefits conferred by the
Legislature on those who enter into civil marriage include, as to property:
joint Massachusetts income tax filing (G. L. c. 62C, § 6); tenancy by the
entirety (a form of ownership that provides certain protections against
creditors and allows for the automatic descent of property to the surviving
spouse without probate) (G. L. c. 184, § 7); extension of the benefit of the
homestead protection (securing up to $ 300,000 in equity from creditors) to one
's spouse and children (G. L. c. 188, § 1); automatic rights to inherit the
property of a deceased spouse who does not leave a will (G. L. c. 190, § 1); the
rights of elective share and of dower (which allow surviving spouses certain
property rights where the decedent spouse has not made adequate provision for
the survivor in [***28] a will) [*324] (G. L. c. 191, § 15, and G. L. c. 189
); entitlement to wages owed to a deceased employee (G. L. c. 149, § 178A
[general] and G. L. c. 149, § 178C [public employees]); eligibility to continue
certain businesses of a deceased spouse (e.g., G. L. c. 112, § 53 [dentist]);
the right to share the medical policy of one's spouse (e.g., G. L. c. 175, §
108, Second [a] [3] [**956] [defining an insured's "dependent" to include one
's spouse), see Connors v. Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 43, 714 N.E.2d 335 (1999)
[domestic partners of city employees not included within the term "dependent" as
used in G. L. c. 32B, § 2]); thirty-nine week continuation of health coverage
for the spouse of a person who is laid off or dies (e.g., G. L. c. 175, § 110G);
preferential options under the Commonwealth's pension system (see G. L. c. 32, §
12 [2] ["Joint and Last Survivor Allowance"]); preferential benefits in the
Commonwealth's medical program, MassHealth (e.g., 130 Code Mass. Regs. § 515.012
[***29] [A] prohibiting placing a lien on long-term care patient's former home
if spouse still lives there); access to veterans' spousal benefits and
preferences (e.g., G. L. c. 115, § 1 [defining "dependents"] and G. L. c. 31, §
26 [State employment] and § 28 [municipal employees]); financial protections for
spouses of certain Commonwealth employees (fire fighters, police officers,
prosecutors, among others) killed in the performance of duty (e.g., G. L. c. 32,
§§ 100-103); the equitable division of marital property on divorce (G. L. c.
208, § 34); temporary and permanent alimony rights (G. L. c. 208, §§ 17 and 34);
the right to separate support on separation of the parties that does not result
in divorce (G. L. c. 209, § 32); and the right to bring claims for wrongful
death and loss of consortium, and for funeral and burial expenses and punitive
damages resulting from tort actions (G. L. c. 229, §§ 1 and 2; G. L. c. 228, § 1
. See [***30] Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., supra).
Exclusive marital benefits that are not directly tied to property rights include
the presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of children born to a married
couple (G. L. c. 209C, § 6, and G. L. c. 46, § 4B); and evidentiary rights, such
as the prohibition against spouses testifying against one another about their
private conversations, applicable in both civil and criminal cases (G. L. c.
233, § 20). Other statutory benefits of a personal nature available only to
married individuals include qualification for [*325] bereavement or medical
leave to care for individuals related by blood or marriage (G. L. c. 149, § 52D
); an automatic "family member" preference to make medical decisions for an
incompetent or disabled spouse who does not have a contrary health care proxy,
see Shine v. Vega, 429 Mass. 456, 466, 709 N.E.2d 58 (1999); the application of
predictable rules of child custody, visitation, support, and removal
out-of-State when married parents divorce (e.g., G. L. c. 208, § 19 [temporary
[***31] custody], § 20 [temporary support], § 28 [custody and support on
judgment of divorce], § 30 [removal from Commonwealth], and § 31 [shared custody
plan]; priority rights to administer the estate of a deceased spouse who dies
without a will, and requirement that surviving spouse must consent to the
appointment of any other person as administrator (G. L. c. 38, § 13 [disposition
of body], and G. L. c. 113, § 8 [anatomical gifts]); and the right to interment
in the lot or tomb owned by one's deceased spouse (G. L. c. 114, §§ 29-33).
Where a married couple has children, their children are also directly or
indirectly, but no less auspiciously, the recipients of the special legal and
economic protections obtained by civil marriage. Notwithstanding the
Commonwealth's strong public policy to abolish legal distinctions between
marital and nonmarital children in providing for the support and care of minors,
see Department of Revenue v. Mason M., 439 Mass. 665, 790 N.E.2d 671 (2003);
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 435 Mass. 536, 546, 760 N.E.2d 257
(2002), the fact remains [***32] that marital children reap a measure of family
stability [**957] and economic security based on their parents' legally
privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not as readily accessible, to
nonmarital children. Some of these benefits are social, such as the enhanced
approval that still attends the status of being a marital child. Others are
material, such as the greater ease of access to family-based State and Federal
benefits that attend the presumptions of one's parentage.
It is undoubtedly for these concrete reasons, as well as for its intimately
personal significance, that civil marriage has long been termed a "civil right."
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817
(1967) ("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our
very existence and survival"), quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541,
86 L. Ed. 1655, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942); [*326] Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48,
56 (1810) (referring to "civil rights incident to marriages"). See also Baehr v.
Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 561, 852 P.2d 44 (1993) (identifying marriage as a "civil
right[ ]"); Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 242, 744 A.2d 864 (1999) [***33]
(Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). The United
States Supreme Court has described the right to marry as "of fundamental
importance for all individuals" and as "part of the fundamental 'right of
privacy' implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978). See Loving
v. Virginia, supra ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men
"). n14
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14 Civil marriage enjoys a dual and in some sense paradoxical status as both a
State-conferred benefit (with its attendant obligations) and a multi-faceted
personal interest of "fundamental importance." Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 383, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978). As a practical matter, the
State could not abolish civil marriage without chaotic consequences. The "right
to marry," id. at 387, is different from rights deemed "fundamental" for equal
protection and due process purposes because the State could, in theory, abolish
all civil marriage while it cannot, for example, abolish all private property
rights.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***34]
Without the right to marry -- or more properly, the right to choose to marry --
one is excluded from the full range of human experience and denied full
protection of the laws for one's "avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting
human relationship." Baker v. State, supra at 229. Because civil marriage is
central to the lives of individuals and the welfare of the community, our laws
assiduously protect the individual's right to marry against undue government
incursion. Laws may not "interfere directly and substantially with the right to
marry." Zablocki v. Redhail, supra at 387. See Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711,
714, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) ("There can be no prohibition of marriage except for an
important social objective and reasonable means"). n15
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n15 The department argues that this case concerns the rights of couples (same
sex and opposite sex), not the rights of individuals. This is incorrect. The
rights implicated in this case are at the core of individual privacy and
autonomy. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87
S. Ct. 1817 (1967) ("Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry,
a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by
the State"); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 716, 198 P.2d 17 (1948) ("The right
to marry is the right of individuals, not of racial groups"). See also A.Z. v.
B.Z., 431 Mass. 150, 162, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (2000), quoting Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977) (noting
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life"). While two
individuals who wish to marry may be equally aggrieved by State action denying
them that opportunity, they do not "share" the liberty and equality interests at
stake.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***35]
[**958] Unquestionably, the regulatory power of the Commonwealth [*327] over
civil marriage is broad, as is the Commonwealth's discretion to award public
benefits. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983)
(marriage); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 652, 417 N.E.2d
387 (1981) (Medicaid benefits). Individuals who have the choice to marry each
other and nevertheless choose not to may properly be denied the legal benefits
of marriage. See Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 334, 693 N.E.2d 141 (1998);
Collins v. Guggenheim, 417 Mass. 615, 618, 631 N.E.2d 1016 (1994); Feliciano v.
Rosemar Silver Co., 401 Mass. 141, 142, 514 N.E.2d 1095 (1987). But that same
logic cannot hold for a qualified individual who would marry if she or he only
could.
B
For decades, indeed centuries, in much of this country (including Massachusetts)
no lawful marriage was possible between white and black Americans. That long
history availed not when the Supreme Court of California held in 1948 that a
legislative prohibition against interracial marriage violated the due process
and equality guarantees [***36] of the Fourteenth Amendment, Perez v. Sharp, 32
Cal.2d 711, 728, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), or when, nineteen years later, the United
States Supreme Court also held that a statutory bar to interracial marriage
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d
1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967). n16 As both Perez and Loving make clear, the right
to marry means [*328] little if it does not include the right to marry the
person of one's choice, subject to appropriate government restrictions in the
interests of public health, safety, and welfare. See Perez v. Sharp, supra at
717 ("the essence of the right to marry is freedom to join in marriage with the
person of one's choice"). See also Loving v. Virginia, supra at 12. In this
case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives individuals of access to an
institution of fundamental legal, personal, and social significance -- the
institution of marriage -- because of a single trait: skin color in Perez and
Loving, sexual orientation here. As it did in Perez and Loving, history must
yield to a more fully developed understanding [***37] of the invidious quality
of the discrimination. n17
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n16 The department argues that the Loving decision did not profoundly alter the
by-then common conception of marriage because it was decided at a time when
antimiscegenation statutes were in "full-scale retreat." But the relationship
the department draws between popular consensus and the constitutionality of a
statute oppressive to a minority group ignores the successful constitutional
challenges to an antimiscegenation statute, initiated some twenty years earlier.
When the Supreme Court of California decided Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 728,
198 P.2d 17 (1948), a precursor to Loving, racial inequality was rampant and
normative, segregation in public and private institutions was commonplace, the
civil rights movement had not yet been launched, and the "separate but equal"
doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 41 L. Ed. 256, 16 S. Ct. 1138
(1896), was still good law. The lack of popular consensus favoring integration
(including interracial marriage) did not deter the Supreme Court of California
from holding that that State's antimiscegenation statute violated the plaintiffs
' constitutional rights. Neither the Perez court nor the Loving Court was
content to permit an unconstitutional situation to fester because the remedy
might not reflect a broad social consensus. [***38]
n17 Recently, the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed that the
Constitution prohibits a State from wielding its formidable power to regulate
conduct in a manner that demeans basic human dignity, even though that statutory
discrimination may enjoy broad public support. The Court struck down a statute
criminalizing sodomy. See Lawrence, supra at 2478 ("The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**959] The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty
against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than does the
Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ essentially the same
language. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 424
Mass. 586, 590, 677 N.E.2d 101 (1997); Corning Glass Works v. Ann & Hope, Inc.
of Danvers, 363 Mass. 409, 416, 294 N.E.2d 354 (1973). That the Massachusetts
Constitution is in some instances more protective of individual liberty
interests than is the Federal Constitution is not surprising. Fundamental
[***39] to the vigor of our Federal system of government is that "state courts
are absolutely free to interpret state constitutional provisions to accord
greater protection to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United
States Constitution." Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 115 S.
Ct. 1185 (1995). n18
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n18 We have recognized that our Constitution may more extensively protect
individual rights than the Federal Constitution in widely different contexts.
See, e.g., Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. State Racing Comm'n, 403
Mass. 692, 532 N.E.2d 644 (1989) (freedom from intrusive drug testing in highly
regulated industry); Cepulonis v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 389 Mass. 930,
452 N.E.2d 1137 (1983) (inmates' right to register to vote); Batchelder v.
Allied Stores Int'l, Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983) (freedom to
solicit signatures for ballot access in public election); Moe v. Secretary of
Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981) (right to State Medicaid
payment for medically necessary abortions); Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414, 204 N.E.2d 281 (1965) (freedom to pursue one's
lawful business).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***40]
The individual liberty and equality safeguards of the [*329] Massachusetts
Constitution protect both "freedom from" unwarranted government intrusion into
protected spheres of life and "freedom to" partake in benefits created by the
State for the common good. See Bachrach v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 382
Mass. 268, 273, 415 N.E.2d 832 (1981); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753,
759, 267 N.E.2d 219 (1971). Both freedoms are involved here. Whether and whom to
marry, how to express sexual intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family
-- these are among the most basic of every individual's liberty and due process
rights. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra at 2481; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349, 92 S. Ct. 1029 (1972);
Loving v. Virginia, supra. And central to personal freedom [***41] and security
is the assurance that the laws will apply equally to persons in similar
situations. "Absolute equality before the law is a fundamental principle of our
own Constitution." Opinion of the Justices, 211 Mass. 618, 619, 98 N.E. 337
(1912). The liberty interest in choosing whether and whom to marry would be
hollow if the Commonwealth could, without sufficient justification, foreclose an
individual from freely choosing the person with whom to share an exclusive
commitment in the unique institution of civil marriage.
The Massachusetts Constitution requires, at a minimum, that the exercise of the
State's regulatory authority not be "arbitrary or capricious." Commonwealth
[**960] v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 542, 320 N.E.2d 911 (1974). n19
Under both the equality and liberty guarantees, regulatory authority must, at
very least, serve "a [*330] legitimate purpose in a rational way"; a statute
must "bear a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective."
Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 413 Mass. 265, 270, 596 N.E.2d 340
(1992). See, e.g., Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass.
763, 778, 767 N.E.2d 549 (2002) [***42] (equal protection); Coffee-Rich, Inc.
v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 348 Mass. 414, 422, 204 N.E.2d 281 (1965) (due
process). Any law failing to satisfy the basic standards of rationality is void.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n19 The Massachusetts Constitution empowers the General Court to enact only
those orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances "wholesome and reasonable," that
are not "repugnant or contrary" to the Constitution, and that, in the
Legislature's judgment, advance the "good and welfare" of the Commonwealth, its
government, and all of its subjects. Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4. See Opinion of
the Justices, 360 Mass. 877, 883, 271 N.E.2d 335 (1971), quoting Jones v.
Robbins, 74 Mass. 329, 8 Gray 329, 343 (1857) (powers vested in government are
set down in the Massachusetts Constitution "in a few plain, clear and
intelligible propositions, for the better guidance and control, both of
legislators and magistrates").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The plaintiffs challenge the marriage statute on both equal [***43] protection
and due process grounds. With respect to each such claim, we must first
determine the appropriate standard of review. Where a statute implicates a
fundamental right or uses a suspect classification, we employ "strict judicial
scrutiny." Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 666, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980). For
all other statutes, we employ the "'rational basis' test." English v. New
England Med. Ctr., 405 Mass. 423, 428, 541 N.E.2d 329 (1989). For due process
claims, rational basis analysis requires that statutes "bear[] a real and
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or some other phase
of the general welfare." Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, supra
, quoting Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Director of the Div. on the Necessaries of
Life, 307 Mass. 408, 418, 30 N.E.2d 269 (1940). For equal protection challenges,
the rational basis test requires that "an impartial lawmaker could logically
believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that
transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class." English v. New
England Med. Ctr., supra at 429, [***44] quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452, 87 L. Ed. 2d 313, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985)
(Stevens, J., concurring). n20
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n20 Not every asserted rational relationship is a "conceivable" one, and
rationality review is not "toothless." Murphy v. Commissioner of the Dep't of
Indus. Accs., 415 Mass. 218, 233, 612 N.E.2d 1149 (1993), citing Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 49 L. Ed. 2d 651, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976). Statutes have
failed rational basis review even in circumstances where no fundamental right or
"suspect" classification is implicated. See, e.g., Murphy v. Commissioner of the
Dep't of Indus. Accs., 415 Mass. 218, 226-227, 612 N.E.2d 1149 (1993) (fee
imposed on retention of counsel in administrative proceedings); Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 373 Mass. 178, 186, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977)
(selection of surname for nonmarital child); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Commissioner of Ins., 358 Mass. 272, 280-281, 263 N.E.2d 698 (1970) (automobile
insurance ratesetting); Coffee-Rich, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Health, 348
Mass. 414, 422, 204 N.E.2d 281 (1965) (sale of wholesome product); Mansfield
Beauty Academy, Inc. v. Board of Registration of Hairdressers, 326 Mass. 624,
627, 96 N.E.2d 145 (1951) (right to charge for materials furnished to models by
trade school); Opinion of the Justices, 322 Mass. 755, 760-761, 79 N.E.2d 883
(1948) (proposed statute concerning regulating cemeteries); Boston Elevated Ry.
v. Commonwealth, 310 Mass. 528, 556-557, 39 N.E.2d 87 (1942) (legislation
impairing contract right); Durgin v. Minot, 203 Mass. 26, 28, 89 N.E. 144 (1909)
(statute authorizing certain board of health regulations).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***45]
[**961] The department argues that no fundamental right or "suspect" [*331]
class is at issue here, n21 and rational basis is the appropriate standard of
review. For the reasons we explain below, we conclude that the marriage ban does
not meet the rational basis test for either due process or equal protection.
Because the statute does not survive rational basis review, we do not consider
the plaintiffs' arguments that this case merits strict judicial scrutiny.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n21 Article 1 of the Massachusetts Constitution specifically prohibits sex-based
discrimination. See post at (Greaney, J., concurring). We have not previously
considered whether "sexual orientation" is a "suspect" classification. Our
resolution of this case does not require that inquiry here.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The department posits three legislative rationales for prohibiting same-sex
couples from marrying: (1) providing a "favorable setting for procreation"; (2)
ensuring the optimal setting for child rearing, which the department defines as
"a two-parent family with one parent [***46] of each sex"; and (3) preserving
scarce State and private financial resources. We consider each in turn.
The judge in the Superior Court endorsed the first rationale, holding that "the
state's interest in regulating marriage is based on the traditional concept that
marriage's primary purpose is procreation." This is incorrect. Our laws of civil
marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married
people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of
creating a family. General Laws c. 207 contains no requirement that the
applicants for a marriage license attest to their ability or intention to
conceive children by coitus. Fertility is not a condition of marriage, nor is it
grounds for divorce. People who have never consummated their marriage, and never
plan to, may be and stay married. See Franklin v. Franklin, 154 Mass. 515, 516,
28 N.E. 681 (1891) ("The consummation of a marriage by [*332] coition is not
necessary to its validity"). n22 People who cannot stir from their deathbed may
marry. See G. L. c. 207, § 28A. While it is certainly true that many, perhaps
most, married couples have children together [***47] (assisted or unassisted),
it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of the marriage partners to one
another, not the begetting of children, that is the sine qua non of civil
marriage. n23
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n22 Our marriage law does recognize that the inability to participate in
intimate relations may have a bearing on one of the central expectations of
marriage. Since the earliest days of the Commonwealth, the divorce statutes have
permitted (but not required) a spouse to choose to divorce his or her impotent
mate. See St. 1785, c. 69, § 3. While infertility is not a ground to void or
terminate a marriage, impotency (the inability to engage in sexual intercourse)
is, at the election of the disaffected spouse. See G. L. c. 207, § 14
(annulment); G. L. c. 208, § 1 (divorce). Cf. Martin v. Otis, 233 Mass. 491,
495, 124 N.E. 294 (1919) ("impotency does not render a marriage void, but only
voidable at the suit of the party conceiving himself or herself to be wronged");
Smith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 404, 408, 50 N.E. 933 (1898) (marriage nullified
because husband's incurable syphilis "leaves him no foundation on which the
marriage relation could properly rest"). See also G. L. c. 207, § 28A. However,
in Hanson v. Hanson, 287 Mass. 154, 191 N.E. 673 (1934), a decree of annulment
for nonconsummation was reversed where the wife knew before the marriage that
her husband had syphilis and voluntarily chose to marry him. We held that, given
the circumstances of the wife's prior knowledge of the full extent of the
disease and her consent to be married, the husband's condition did not go "to
the essence" of the marriage. Id. at 159. [***48]
n23 It is hardly surprising that civil marriage developed historically as a
means to regulate heterosexual conduct and to promote child rearing, because
until very recently unassisted heterosexual relations were the only means short
of adoption by which children could come into the world, and the absence of
widely available and effective contraceptives made the link between heterosexual
sex and procreation very strong indeed. Punitive notions of illegitimacy, see
Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650, 661, 506 N.E.2d 842 (1987), and of
homosexual identity, see Lawrence, supra at 2478-2479, further cemented the
common and legal understanding of marriage as an unquestionably heterosexual
institution. But it is circular reasoning, not analysis, to maintain that
marriage must remain a heterosexual institution because that is what it
historically has been. As one dissent acknowledges, in "the modern age,"
"heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and childcare are not necessarily
conjoined." Post at (Cordy, J., dissenting).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**962] Moreover, the Commonwealth affirmatively facilitates [***49] bringing
children into a family regardless of whether the intended parent is married or
unmarried, whether the child is adopted or born into a family, whether assistive
technology was used to conceive the child, and whether the parent or her partner
is [*333] heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual. n24 If procreation were a
necessary component of civil marriage, our statutes would draw a tighter circle
around the permissible bounds of nonmarital child bearing and the creation of
families by noncoital means. The attempt to isolate procreation as "the source
of a fundamental right to marry," post at (Cordy, J., dissenting), overlooks the
integrated way in which courts have examined the complex and overlapping realms
of personal autonomy, marriage, family life, and child rearing. Our
jurisprudence recognizes that, in these nuanced and fundamentally private areas
of life, such a narrow focus is inappropriate.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n24 Adoption and certain insurance coverage for assisted reproductive technology
are available to married couples, same- sex couples, and single individuals
alike. See G. L. c. 210, § 1; Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315
(1993) (adoption); G. L. c. 175, § 47H; G. L. c. 176A, § 8K; G. L. c. 176B, § 4J
; and G. L. c. 176G, § 4 (insurance coverage). See also Woodward v. Commissioner
of Social Sec., 435 Mass. 536, 546, 760 N.E.2d 257 (2002) (posthumous
reproduction); Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 293,
756 N.E.2d 1133 (2001) (gestational surrogacy).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***50]
The "marriage is procreation" argument singles out the one unbridgeable
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, and transforms that
difference into the essence of legal marriage. Like "Amendment 2" to the
Constitution of Colorado, which effectively denied homosexual persons equality
under the law and full access to the political process, the marriage restriction
impermissibly "identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board." Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 134 L. Ed. 2d
855, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). In so doing, the State's action confers an official
stamp of approval on the destructive stereotype that same-sex relationships are
inherently unstable and inferior to opposite-sex relationships and are not
worthy of respect. n25
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n25 Because our laws expressly or implicitly sanction so many kinds of
opposite-sex marriages that do not or will never result in unassisted
reproduction, it is erroneous to claim, as the dissent does, that the
"theoretical[]" procreative capacity of opposite-sex couples, post at (Cordy,
J., dissenting), sufficiently justifies excluding from civil marriage same-sex
couples who actually have children.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***51]
The department's first stated rationale, equating marriage with unassisted
heterosexual procreation, shades imperceptibly into its second: that confining
marriage to opposite-sex couples ensures that children are raised in the
"optimal" setting. Protecting [*334] the welfare of children is a paramount
State policy. Restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples, however, cannot
plausibly further this policy. "The demographic changes of the past [**963]
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The
composition of families varies greatly from household to household." Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
Massachusetts has responded supportively to "the changing realities of the
American family," id. at 64, and has moved vigorously to strengthen the modern
family in its many variations. See, e.g., G. L. c. 209C (paternity statute); G.
L. c. 119, § 39D (grandparent visitation statute); Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass.
649, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1022,
123 S. Ct. 1259 (2003) (same); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 711 N.E.2d 886,
[***52] cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1005, 145 L. Ed. 2d 386, 120 S. Ct. 500 (1999)
(de facto parent); Youmans v. Ramos, 429 Mass. 774, 782, 711 N.E.2d 165 (1999)
(same); and Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993) (coparent
adoption). Moreover, we have repudiated the common-law power of the State to
provide varying levels of protection to children based on the circumstances of
birth. See G. L. c. 209C (paternity statute); Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass.
650, 661, 506 N.E.2d 842 (1987) ("Ours is an era in which logic and compassion
have impelled the law toward unburdening children from the stigma and the
disadvantages heretofore attendant upon the status of illegitimacy"). The "best
interests of the child" standard does not turn on a parent's sexual orientation
or marital status. See e.g., Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 503, 452 N.E.2d
293 (1983) (parent's sexual orientation insufficient ground to deny custody of
child in divorce action). See also E.N.O. v. L.M.M., supra at 829-830 (best
interests of child determined by considering child's relationship with
biological and de facto same-sex parents); Silvia v. Silvia, 9 Mass. App. Ct.
339, 341, 400 N.E.2d 1330 & n.3 (1980) [***53] (collecting support and custody
statutes containing no gender distinction).
The department has offered no evidence that forbidding marriage to people of the
same sex will increase the number of couples choosing to enter into opposite-sex
marriages in order to have and raise children. There is thus no rational
relationship between the marriage statute and the Commonwealth's proffered goal
of protecting the "optimal" child rearing unit. Moreover, the department readily
concedes that people in same-sex couples may be "excellent" parents. These
couples (including [*335] four of the plaintiff couples) have children for the
reasons others do -- to love them, to care for them, to nurture them. But the
task of child rearing for same-sex couples is made infinitely harder by their
status as outliers to the marriage laws. While establishing the parentage of
children as soon as possible is crucial to the safety and welfare of children,
see Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 292, 756 N.E.2d
1133 (2001), same-sex couples must undergo the sometimes lengthy and intrusive
process of second-parent adoption to establish their joint parentage. While the
enhanced income [***54] provided by marital benefits is an important source of
security and stability for married couples and their children, those benefits
are denied to families headed by same-sex couples. See, e.g., note 6, supra.
While the laws of divorce provide clear and reasonably predictable guidelines
for child support, child custody, and property division on dissolution of a
marriage, same-sex couples who dissolve their relationships find themselves and
their children in the highly unpredictable terrain of equity jurisdiction. See
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., supra. Given the wide range of public benefits reserved only
for married couples, we do not credit the department's contention that the
absence of access to civil marriage [**964] amounts to little more than an
inconvenience to same-sex couples and their children. Excluding same-sex couples
from civil marriage will not make children of opposite-sex marriages more
secure, but it does prevent children of same-sex couples from enjoying the
immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of "a stable family
structure in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized." Post at
(Cordy, J., dissenting). n26
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n26 The claim that the constitutional rights to bear and raise a child are "not
implicated or infringed" by the marriage ban, post at (Cordy, J., dissenting),
does not stand up to scrutiny. The absolute foreclosure of the marriage option
for the class of parents and would-be parents at issue here imposes a heavy
burden on their decision to have and raise children that is not suffered by any
other class of parent.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***55]
No one disputes that the plaintiff couples are families, that many are parents,
and that the children they are raising, like all children, need and should have
the fullest opportunity to grow up in a secure, protected family unit.
Similarly, no one disputes that, under the rubric of marriage, the State
provides a [*336] cornucopia of substantial benefits to married parents and
their children. The preferential treatment of civil marriage reflects the
Legislature's conclusion that marriage "is the foremost setting for the
education and socialization of children" precisely because it "encourages
parents to remain committed to each other and to their children as they grow."
Post at (Cordy, J., dissenting).
In this case, we are confronted with an entire, sizeable class of parents
raising children who have absolutely no access to civil marriage and its
protections because they are forbidden from procuring a marriage license. It
cannot be rational under our laws, and indeed it is not permitted, to penalize
children by depriving them of State benefits because the State disapproves of
their parents' sexual orientation.
The third rationale advanced by the department is that limiting marriage [***56]
to opposite-sex couples furthers the Legislature's interest in conserving scarce
State and private financial resources. The marriage restriction is rational, it
argues, because the General Court logically could assume that same-sex couples
are more financially independent than married couples and thus less needy of
public marital benefits, such as tax advantages, or private marital benefits,
such as employer-financed health plans that include spouses in their coverage.
An absolute statutory ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational relationship to
the goal of economy. First, the department's conclusory generalization -- that
same-sex couples are less financially dependent on each other than opposite-sex
couples -- ignores that many same-sex couples, such as many of the plaintiffs in
this case, have children and other dependents (here, aged parents) in their
care. n27 The department does not contend, nor could it, that these dependents
are less needy or deserving than the dependents of married couples. Second,
Massachusetts marriage laws do not condition receipt of public and private
financial benefits to married individuals on a demonstration of financial
dependence on each other; [***57] the benefits are available to married
couples regardless of whether [*337] they mingle their finances or actually
depend on each other for support.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n27 It is also true that civil marriage creates legal dependency between
spouses, which is simply not available to unmarried couples. See Part III A,
supra.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The department suggests additional rationales for prohibiting same-sex couples
from marrying, which are developed by [**965] some amici. It argues that
broadening civil marriage to include same-sex couples will trivialize or destroy
the institution of marriage as it has historically been fashioned. Certainly our
decision today marks a significant change in the definition of marriage as it
has been inherited from the common law, and understood by many societies for
centuries. But it does not disturb the fundamental value of marriage in our
society.
Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the institution
of civil marriage. They do not want marriage abolished. They do not attack the
binary nature [***58] of marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any of the
other gate-keeping provisions of the marriage licensing law. Recognizing the
right of an individual to marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the
validity or dignity of opposite-sex marriage, any more than recognizing the
right of an individual to marry a person of a different race devalues the
marriage of a person who marries someone of her own race. n28 If anything,
extending civil marriage to same-sex couples reinforces the importance of
marriage to individuals and communities. That same-sex couples are willing to
embrace marriage's solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in
our laws and in the human spirit. n29
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n28 Justice Cordy suggests that we have "transmuted the 'right' to marry into a
right to change the institution of marriage itself," post at (Cordy, J.,
dissenting), because marriage is intimately tied to the reproductive systems of
the marriage partners and to the "optimal" mother and father setting for child
rearing. Id. That analysis hews perilously close to the argument, long
repudiated by the Legislature and the courts, that men and women are so innately
and fundamentally different that their respective "proper spheres" can be
rigidly and universally delineated. An abundance of legislative enactments and
decisions of this court negate any such stereotypical premises. [***59]
n29 We are concerned only with the withholding of the benefits, protections,
and obligations of civil marriage from a certain class of persons for invalid
reasons. Our decision in no way limits the rights of individuals to refuse to
marry persons of the same sex for religious or any other reasons. It in no way
limits the personal freedom to disapprove of, or to encourage others to
disapprove of, same-sex marriage. Our concern, rather, is whether historical,
cultural, religious, or other reasons permit the State to impose limits on
personal beliefs concerning whom a person should marry.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
It has been argued that, due to the State's strong interest in [*338] the
institution of marriage as a stabilizing social structure, only the Legislature
can control and define its boundaries. Accordingly, our elected representatives
legitimately may choose to exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage in order
to assure all citizens of the Commonwealth that (1) the benefits of our marriage
laws are available explicitly to create and support a family setting that is, in
the Legislature's view, optimal for child [***60] rearing, and (2) the State
does not endorse gay and lesbian parenthood as the equivalent of being raised by
one's married biological parents. n30 These [**966] arguments miss the point.
The Massachusetts Constitution requires that legislation meet certain criteria
and not extend beyond certain limits. It is the function of courts to determine
whether these criteria are met and whether these limits are exceeded. In most
instances, these limits are defined by whether a rational basis exists to
conclude that legislation will bring about a rational result. The Legislature in
the first instance, and the courts in the last instance, must ascertain whether
such a rational basis exists. To label the court's role as usurping that of the
Legislature, see, e.g., post at (Cordy, J., dissenting), is to misunderstand the
nature [*339] and purpose of judicial review. We owe great deference to the
Legislature to decide social and policy issues, but it is the traditional and
settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues. n31
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n30 Justice Cordy's dissenting opinion, post at - and nn. 24-28 (Cordy, J.,
dissenting), makes much of the current "battle of the experts" concerning the
possible long-term effects on children of being raised in households headed by
same-sex parents. We presume that the Legislature is aware of these studies, see
Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 487, 86 N.E. 916 (1909), aff'd, 222
U.S. 225, 56 L. Ed. 175, 32 S. Ct. 74 (1911), and has drawn the conclusion that
a child's best interest is not harmed by being raised and nurtured by same-sex
parents. See G. L. c. 210, § 7. See also Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619
N.E.2d 315 (1993); 110 Code Mass. Regs. § 1.09 (3) (2000) ("The Department [of
Social Services] shall not deny to any person the opportunity to become an
adoptive or foster parent, on the basis of the . . . sexual orientation . . . of
the person, or of the child, involved"). Either the Legislature's openness to
same-sex parenting is rational in light of its paramount interests in promoting
children's well-being, or irrational in light of its so-called conclusion that a
household headed by opposite-sex married parents is the "optimal" setting for
raising children. See post at (Cordy, J., dissenting). We give full credit to
the Legislature for enacting a statutory scheme of child-related laws that is
coherent, consistent, and harmonious. See New England Div. of the Am. Cancer Soc
'y v. Commissioner of Admin., 437 Mass. 172, 180, 769 N.E.2d 1248 (2002).
[***61]
n31 If total deference to the Legislature were the case, the judiciary would be
stripped of its constitutional authority to decide challenges to statutes
pertaining to marriage, child rearing, and family relationships, and,
conceivably, unconstitutional laws that provided for the forced sterilization of
habitual criminals; prohibited miscegenation; required court approval for the
marriage of persons with child support obligations; compelled a pregnant
unmarried minor to obtain the consent of both parents before undergoing an
abortion; and made sodomy a criminal offense, to name just a few, would stand.
Indeed, every State court that has recently considered the issue we decide today
has exercised its duty in the same way, by carefully scrutinizing the statutory
ban on same-sex marriages in light of relevant State constitutional provisions.
See Brause vs. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CJ (Alaska Super. Ct.,
Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding marriage statute violated right to privacy provision
in Alaska Constitution) (superseded by constitutional amendment, art. I, § 25 of
the Constitution of Alaska); Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 571-580, 852 P.2d 44
(1993) (concluding marriage statute implicated Hawaii Constitution's equal
protection clause; remanding case to lower court for further proceedings); Baker
v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 197-198, 744 A.2d 864 (1999) (concluding marriage statute
violated Vermont Constitution's common benefits clause). But see Standhardt v.
Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (marriage statute does not
violate liberty interests under either Federal or Arizona Constitution). See
also Halpern v. Toronto (City), 172 O.A.C. 276 (2003) (concluding marriage
statute violated equal protection provisions of Canada's Charter of Rights and
Freedoms); Eagle Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1
(2003) (same).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***62]
The history of constitutional law "is the story of the extension of
constitutional rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded."
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735, 116 S. Ct. 2264
(1996) (construing equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit categorical exclusion of women from public military institute). This
statement is as true in the area of civil marriage as in any other area of civil
rights. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct.
2254 (1987); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817
(1967); Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). As a public
institution and a right of fundamental [**967] importance, civil marriage is
an evolving paradigm. The common law was exceptionally harsh toward women who
became wives: a woman's legal identity all but evaporated into that of her
husband. See generally C.P. Kindregan, Jr., & M.L. Inker, Family Law and
Practice §§ 1.9 and 1.10 (3d ed. 2002). Thus, one [*340] early Nineteenth
Century jurist could observe matter of factly that, prior to the abolition of
slavery [***63] in Massachusetts, "the condition of a slave resembled the
connection of a wife with her husband, and of infant children with their father.
He is obliged to maintain them, and they cannot be separated from him."
Winchendon v. Hatfield, 4 Mass. 123, 129 (1808). But since at least the middle
of the Nineteenth Century, both the courts and the Legislature have acted to
ameliorate the harshness of the common-law regime. In Bradford v. Worcester, 184
Mass. 557, 562, 69 N.E. 310 (1904), we refused to apply the common-law rule that
the wife's legal residence was that of her husband to defeat her claim to a
municipal "settlement of paupers." In Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351
N.E.2d 526 (1976), we abrogated the common-law doctrine immunizing a husband
against certain suits because the common-law rule was predicated on
"antediluvian assumptions concerning the role and status of women in marriage
and in society." Id. at 621. Alarms about the imminent erosion of the "natural"
order of marriage were sounded over the demise of antimiscegenation laws, the
expansion of the rights of married women, and the introduction of "no-fault"
[***64] divorce. n32 Marriage has survived all of these transformations, and we
have no doubt that marriage will continue to be a vibrant and revered
institution.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n32 One prominent historian of marriage notes, for example, that in the
Nineteenth Century, the Reverend Theodore Woolsey led the charge against
expanding the grounds for divorce, arguing that the "the only divinely approved
(and therefore truly legitimate) reason for divorce was adultery" and that only
the innocent party to a marriage terminated by reason of adultery be permitted
to remarry. Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation 106 (2000).
See id. at 44-45, for a general discussion of resistance to the demise of
antimiscegenation laws.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
We also reject the argument suggested by the department, and elaborated by some
amici, that expanding the institution of civil marriage in Massachusetts to
include same-sex couples will lead to interstate conflict. We would not presume
to dictate how another State should respond to today's decision. [***65] But
neither should considerations of comity prevent us from according Massachusetts
residents the full measure of protection available under the Massachusetts
Constitution. The genius of our Federal system is that each State's Constitution
has vitality specific to [*341] its own traditions, and that, subject to the
minimum requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, each State is free to address
difficult issues of individual liberty in the manner its own Constitution
demands.
Several amici suggest that prohibiting marriage by same-sex couples reflects
community consensus that homosexual conduct is immoral. Yet Massachusetts has a
strong affirmative policy of preventing discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. See G. L. c. 151B (employment, housing, credit, services); G. L. c.
265, § 39 (hate crimes); G. L. c. 272, § 98 (public accommodation); G. L. c. 76,
§ 5 (public education). See also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass.
298, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974) (decriminalization of private consensual adult
conduct); Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 503, 452 N.E.2d 293 (1983) [***66]
(custody to homosexual parent not per se prohibited).
[**968] The department has had more than ample opportunity to articulate a
constitutionally adequate justification for limiting civil marriage to
opposite-sex unions. It has failed to do so. The department has offered
purported justifications for the civil marriage restriction that are starkly at
odds with the comprehensive network of vigorous, gender-neutral laws promoting
stable families and the best interests of children. It has failed to identify
any relevant characteristic that would justify shutting the door to civil
marriage to a person who wishes to marry someone of the same sex.
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of
the community for no rational reason. The absence of any reasonable relationship
between, on the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who
wish to enter into civil marriage and, on the other, protection of public
health, safety, or general welfare, suggests that the marriage restriction is
rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who are (or who are believed to
be) homosexual. n33 "The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither
can it [***67] [*342] tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach
of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 80 L. Ed. 2d 421, 104 S. Ct. 1879 (1984)
(construing Fourteenth Amendment). Limiting the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic
premises of individual liberty and equality under law protected by the
Massachusetts Constitution.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n33 It is not dispositive, for purposes of our constitutional analysis, whether
the Legislature, at the time it incorporated the common-law definition of
marriage into the first marriage laws nearly three centuries ago, did so with
the intent of discriminating against or harming persons who wish to marry
another of the same sex. We are not required to impute an invidious intent to
the Legislature in determining that a statute of long standing has no
applicability to present circumstances or violates the rights of individuals
under the Massachusetts Constitution. That the Legislature may have intended
what at the time of enactment was a perfectly reasonable form of discrimination
-- or a result not recognized as a form of discrimination -- was not enough to
salvage from later constitutional challenge laws burdening nonmarital children
or denying women's equal partnership in marriage. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 52 L. Ed. 2d 31, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977) (nonmarital children);
Angelini v. OMD Corp., 410 Mass. 653, 662, 663, 575 N.E.2d 41 (1987) ("The
traditional common law rules which discriminated against children born out of
wedlock have been discarded" and "we have recognized that placing additional
burdens on [nonmarital] children is unfair because they are not responsible for
their [status]"); Silvia v. Silvia, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 340-341, 400 N.E.2d
1330 (1980) (there now exists "a comprehensive statutory and common law pattern
which places marital and parental obligations on both the husband and wife"). We
are concerned with the operation of challenged laws on the parties before us,
and we do not inhibit our inquiry on the ground that a statute's original
enactors had a benign or at the time constitutionally unassailable purpose. See
Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 378 Mass. 550, 557, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979),
quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 678, 25 L. Ed. 2d
697, 90 S. Ct. 1409 (1970) ("the mere fact that a certain practice has gone
unchallenged for a long period of time cannot alone immunize it from
constitutional invalidity, 'even when that span of time covers our entire
national existence and indeed predates it'"); Merit Oil Co. v. Director of Div.
on the Necessaries of Life, 319 Mass. 301, 305, 65 N.E.2d 529 (1946)
(constitutional contours of State's regulatory authority coextensive "with the
changing needs of society").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***68]
IV
We consider next the plaintiffs' request for relief. We preserve as much of the
statute as may be preserved in the face of the successful constitutional
challenge. [**969] See Mayor of Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 384 Mass.
718, 725, 429 N.E.2d 691 (1981); Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 759,
267 N.E.2d 219 (1971). See also G. L. c. 4, § 6, Eleventh.
Here, no one argues that striking down the marriage laws is an appropriate form
of relief. Eliminating civil marriage would be wholly inconsistent with the
Legislature's deep commitment to fostering stable families and would dismantle a
vital organizing [*343] principle of our society. n34 We face a problem
similar to one that recently confronted the Court of Appeal for Ontario, the
highest court of that Canadian province, when it considered the
constitutionality of the same-sex marriage ban under Canada's Federal
Constitution, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter). See Halpern v.
Toronto (City), 172 O.A.C. 276 (2003). Canada, like the United States, adopted
the common law of England that civil marriage is "the voluntary union for life
of one man [***69] and one woman, to the exclusion of all others." Id. at par.
(36), quoting Hyde v. Hyde, [1861-1873] All E.R. 175 (1866). In holding that the
limitation of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the Charter, the
Court of Appeal refined the common-law meaning of marriage. We concur with this
remedy, which is entirely consonant with established principles of jurisprudence
empowering a court to refine a common-law principle in light of evolving
constitutional standards. See Powers v. Wilkinson, 399 Mass. 650, 661-662, 506
N.E.2d 842 (1987) (reforming common-law rule of construction of "issue"); Lewis
v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 629, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976) (abolishing common-law rule
of certain interspousal immunity).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n34 Similarly, no one argues that the restrictions on incestuous or polygamous
marriages are so dependent on the marriage restriction that they too should fall
if the marriage restriction falls. Nothing in our opinion today should be
construed as relaxing or abrogating the consanguinity or polygamy prohibitions
of our marriage laws. See G. L. c. 207, §§ 1, 2, and 4. Rather, the statutory
provisions concerning consanguinity or polygamous marriages shall be construed
in a gender neutral manner. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 92-93, 61 L.
Ed. 2d 382, 99 S. Ct. 2655 (1979) (construing word "father" in unconstitutional,
underinclusive provision to mean "parent"); Browne's Case, 322 Mass. 429, 430,
77 N.E.2d 649 (1948) (construing masculine pronoun "his" to include feminine
pronoun "her"). See also G. L. c. 4, § 6, Fourth ("words of one gender may be
construed to include the other gender and the neuter" unless such construction
would be "inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or
repugnant to the context of the same statute").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***70]
We construe civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as
spouses, to the exclusion of all others. This reformulation redresses the
plaintiffs' constitutional injury and furthers the aim of marriage to promote
stable, exclusive relationships. It advances the two legitimate State interests
the department has identified: providing a stable setting for child rearing and
conserving State resources. It leaves intact the [*344] Legislature's broad
discretion to regulate marriage. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171,
175, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983).
In their complaint the plaintiffs request only a declaration that their
exclusion and the exclusion of other qualified same-sex couples from access to
civil marriage violates Massachusetts law. We declare that barring an individual
from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because
that person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts
Constitution. We vacate the summary judgment for the department. We remand this
case to the [**970] Superior Court for entry of judgment consistent with this
opinion. Entry of judgment shall be stayed for 180 days to permit the
Legislature to [***71] take such action as it may deem appropriate in light of
this opinion. See, e.g., Michaud v. Sheriff of Essex County, 390 Mass. 523,
535-536, 458 N.E.2d 702 (1983).
So ordered.
CONCURBY: GREANEY
CONCUR: GREANEY, J. (concurring). I agree with the result reached by the court,
the remedy ordered, and much of the reasoning in the court's opinion. In my
view, however, the case is more directly resolved using traditional equal
protection analysis.
(a) Article 1 of the Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 106 of the
Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, provides:
"All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and
unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and
defending their lives and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and obtaining their safety and
happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of
sex, race, color, creed or national origin."
This provision, even prior to its amendment, guaranteed to all people in the
Commonwealth -- equally -- the enjoyment of rights that are deemed important or
fundamental. The [***72] withholding of relief from the plaintiffs, who wish to
marry, and are [*345] otherwise eligible to marry, on the ground that the
couples are of the same gender, constitutes a categorical restriction of a
fundamental right. The restriction creates a straightforward case of
discrimination that disqualifies an entire group of our citizens and their
families from participation in an institution of paramount legal and social
importance. This is impermissible under art. 1.
Analysis begins with the indisputable premise that the deprivation suffered by
the plaintiffs is no mere legal inconvenience. The right to marry is not a
privilege conferred by the State, but a fundamental right that is protected
against unwarranted State interference. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
384, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978) ("the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967) (freedom to marry is "one of the
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men"
under due process clause of Fourteenth Amendment); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942) [***73] (marriage is one of
"basic civil rights of man"). See also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96, 96
L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987) (prisoners' right to marry is
constitutionally protected). This right is essentially vitiated if one is denied
the right to marry a person of one's choice. See Zablocki v. Redhail, supra at
384 (all recent decisions of United States Supreme Court place "the decision to
marry as among the personal decisions protected by the right of privacy"). n1
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 It makes no difference that the referenced decisions consider the right to
marry in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution rather than in the context of our Constitution. As explained by the
court, ante at n.18, a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution enjoys
at least a comparable measure of protection under our State Constitution. See
Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 651, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[**971] Because our [***74] marriage statutes intend, and state, the ordinary
understanding that marriage under our law consists only of a union between a man
and a woman, they create a statutory classification based on the sex of the two
people who wish to marry. See Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 564, 852 P.2d 44
(1993) (plurality opinion) (Hawaii marriage statutes created sex-based
classification); Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 253, 744 A.2d 864 (1999) (Johnson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same). That the classification
is [*346] sex based is self-evident. The marriage statutes prohibit some
applicants, such as the plaintiffs, from obtaining a marriage license, and that
prohibition is based solely on the applicants' gender. As a factual matter, an
individual's choice of marital partner is constrained because of his or her own
sex. Stated in particular terms, Hillary Goodridge cannot marry Julie Goodridge
because she (Hillary) is a woman. Likewise, Gary Chalmers cannot marry Richard
Linnell because he (Gary) is a man. Only their gender prevents Hillary and Gary
from marrying their chosen partners under the present law. n2
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 In her separate opinion in Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 253, 744 A.2d 864
(1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), Justice Johnson
described the equal protection defect in Vermont's marriage statutes in a
slightly different, but no less persuasive, fashion:
"A woman is denied the right to marry another woman because her would-be partner
is a woman, not because one or both are lesbians. Similarly, a man is denied the
right to marry another man because his would-be partner is a man, not because
one or both are gay. Thus, an individual's right to marry a person of the same
sex is prohibited solely on the basis of sex, not on the basis of sexual
orientation. Indeed, sexual orientation does not appear as a qualification for
marriage under the marriage statutes. The State makes no inquiry into the sexual
practices or identities of a couple seeking a license."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***75]
A classification may be gender based whether or not the challenged government
action apportions benefits or burdens uniformly along gender lines. This is so
because constitutional protections extend to individuals and not to categories
of people. Thus, when an individual desires to marry, but cannot marry his or
her chosen partner because of the traditional opposite-sex restriction, a
violation of art. 1 has occurred. See Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229,
237-238, 741 N.E.2d 17 (2001) (assuming statute enforceable only across gender
lines may offend Massachusetts equal rights amendment). I find it disingenuous,
at best, to suggest that such an individual's right to marry has not been
burdened at all, because he or she remains free to chose another partner, who is
of the opposite sex.
The equal protection infirmity at work here is strikingly similar to (although,
perhaps, more subtle than) the invidious discrimination perpetuated by Virginia
's antimiscegenation laws [*347] and unveiled in the decision of Loving v.
Virginia, supra. In its landmark decision striking down Virginia's ban on
marriages between Caucasians and members of any other race on [***76] both
equal protection and substantive due process grounds, the United States Supreme
Court soundly rejected the proposition that the equal application of the ban
(i.e., that it applied equally to whites and blacks) made unnecessary the strict
scrutiny analysis traditionally required of statutes drawing classifications
according to race, see id. at 8-9, and concluded that "restricting the freedom
to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning
of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 12. That our marriage laws, unlike
antimiscegenation laws, were not enacted purposely to discriminate in no way
[**972] neutralizes their present discriminatory character.
With these two propositions established (the infringement on a fundamental right
and a sex-based classification), the enforcement of the marriage statutes as
they are currently understood is forbidden by our Constitution unless the State
can present a compelling purpose furthered by the statutes that can be
accomplished in no other reasonable manner. n3 See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass.
649, 655-656, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1189, 154 L. Ed. 2d
1022, 123 S. Ct. 1259 (2003); [***77] Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663,
667-669, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980). This the State has not done. The justifications
put forth by the State to sustain the statute's exclusion of the plaintiffs are
insufficient for the reasons explained by the court, to which I add the
following observations.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 Some might say that the use of the so-called strict scrutiny formula is too
facile in the sense that, once a court focuses on the formula as a dispositional
tool, the result is automatically preordained -- the statute will fail because
the State cannot possibly sustain its heavy burden to overcome the presumption
of arbitrary and invidious discrimination. This is not so. See, e.g., Blixt v.
Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 656-657, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1189, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1022, 123 S. Ct. 1259 (2003) (concluding G. L. c. 119, § 39D
, grandparent visitation statute, furthered compelling State interest in
mitigating potential harm to children in nonintact families).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***78]
The rights of couples to have children, to adopt, and to be foster parents,
regardless of sexual orientation and marital status, are firmly established. See
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 429 Mass. 824, 829, 711 N.E.2d 886, cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1005, 145 L. Ed. 2d 386, 120 S. Ct. 500 (1999); Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass.
205, 210-211, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993). As recognized in the court's opinion, and
demonstrated by the record in this case, however, [*348] the State's refusal
to accord legal recognition to unions of same-sex couples has had the effect of
creating a system in which children of same-sex couples are unable to partake of
legal protections and social benefits taken for granted by children in families
whose parents are of the opposite sex. The continued maintenance of this
caste-like system is irreconcilable with, indeed, totally repugnant to, the
State's strong interest in the welfare of all children and its primary focus, in
the context of family law where children are concerned, on "the best interests
of the child." The issue at stake is not one, as might ordinarily be the case,
that can be unilaterally and totally deferred to the wisdom of the Legislature.
"While the State [***79] retains wide latitude to decide the manner in which it
will allocate benefits, it may not use criteria which discriminatorily burden
the exercise of a fundamental right." Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382
Mass. 629, 652, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981). Nor can the State's wish to conserve
resources be accomplished by invidious distinctions between classes of citizens.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-217, 227, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 102 S. Ct. 2382
(1982). n4
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 The argument, made by some in the case, that legalization of same-sex
marriage in Massachusetts will be used by persons in other States as a tool to
obtain recognition of a marriage in their State that is otherwise unlawful, is
precluded by the provisions of G. L. c. 207, §§ 11, 12, and 13.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
A comment is in order with respect to the insistence of some that marriage is,
as a matter of definition, the legal union of a man and a woman. To define
[***80] the institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it
always has been accessible, in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom
it never has been accessible, is conclusory and bypasses the core [**973]
question we are asked to decide. n5 This case calls for a higher level of legal
analysis. Precisely, the case requires that we confront ingrained assumptions
with respect to historically accepted roles of men and women within the
institution of marriage and requires that we reexamine these assumptions in
light of the [*349] unequivocal language of art. 1, in order to ensure that
the governmental conduct challenged here conforms to the supreme charter of our
Commonwealth. "A written constitution is the fundamental law for the government
of a sovereign State. It is the final statement of the rights, privileges and
obligations of the citizens and the ultimate grant of the powers and the
conclusive definition of the limitations of the departments of State and of
public officers . . . . To its provisions the conduct of all governmental
affairs must conform. From its terms there is no appeal." Loring v. Young, 239
Mass. 349, 376-377, 132 N.E. 65 (1921). I do not doubt [***81] the sincerity of
deeply held moral or religious beliefs that make inconceivable to some the
notion that any change in the common- law definition of what constitutes a legal
civil marriage is now, or ever would be, warranted. But, as matter of
constitutional law, neither the mantra of tradition, nor individual conviction,
can justify the perpetuation of a hierarchy in which couples of the same sex and
their families are deemed less worthy of social and legal recognition than
couples of the opposite sex and their families. See Lawrence v. Texas, 156 L.
Ed. 2d 508, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2486 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (moral
disapproval, with no other valid State interest, cannot justify law that
discriminates against groups of persons); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa.
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) ("Our
obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code").
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5 Because marriage is, by all accounts, the cornerstone of our social
structure, as well as the defining relationship in our personal lives, confining
eligibility in the institution, and all of its accompanying benefits and
responsibilities, to opposite-sex couples is basely unfair. To justify the
restriction in our marriage laws by accusing the plaintiffs of attempting to
change the institution of marriage itself, terminates the debate at the outset
without any accompanying reasoned analysis.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***82]
(b) I am hopeful that our decision will be accepted by those thoughtful citizens
who believe that same-sex unions should not be approved by the State. I am not
referring here to acceptance in the sense of grudging acknowledgment of the
court's authority to adjudicate the matter. My hope is more liberating. The
plaintiffs are members of our community, our neighbors, our coworkers, our
friends. As pointed out by the court, their professions include investment
advisor, computer engineer, teacher, therapist, and lawyer. The plaintiffs
volunteer in our schools, worship beside us in our religious houses, and have
children who play with our children, to mention just a few ordinary daily
contacts. We share a common humanity and participate together in the social
contract that is the foundation of our Commonwealth. Simple principles of
decency dictate that we [*350] extend to the plaintiffs, and to their new
status, full acceptance, tolerance, and respect. We should do so because it is
the right thing to do. The union of two people contemplated by G. L. c. 207 "is
a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes [***83] a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as
noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, [**974] 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678
(1965). Because of the terms of art. 1, the plaintiffs will no longer be
excluded from that association. n6
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 Justice Cordy's separate opinion points out, correctly, that, when art. 1 was
revised by the people in 1976, it was not then intended to be relied on to
approve same-sex marriage. Post at (Cordy, J., dissenting). (Justice Spina
adverts to the same proposition in his separate opinion, post at [Spina, J.,
dissenting]). Decisions construing the provision cited in Justice Cordy's
opinion are interesting, but obviously inapposite because they have not dealt in
any significant way with the issue before us. Nonetheless, the separate opinion
concludes, from what was intended in 1976, and from various cases discussing
art. 1, that the revised provision cannot be used to justify the result I reach.
In so reasoning, the separate opinion places itself squarely on the side of the
original intent school of constitutional interpretation. As a general principle,
I do not accept the philosophy of the school. The Massachusetts Constitution was
never meant to create dogma that adopts inflexible views of one time to deny
lawful rights to those who live in another. The provisions of our Constitution
are, and must be, adaptable to changing circumstances and new societal
phenomena, and, unless and until the people speak again on a specific subject,
conformable in their concepts of liberty and equality to what is fair, right,
and just. I am cognizant of the voters' intent in passing the amendment to art.
1 in 1976. Were the revision alone the basis for change, I would be reluctant to
construe it favorably to the plaintiffs, in view of the amendment's recent
passage and the voters' intent. The court's opinion, however, rests in part on
well-established principles of equal protection that are independent of the
amendment. It is on these principles that I base my opinion.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***84]
DISSENTBY: SPINA; SOSMAN; CORDY
DISSENT: SPINA, J. (dissenting, with whom Sosman and Cordy, JJ., join). What is
at stake in this case is not the unequal treatment of individuals or whether
individual rights have been impermissibly burdened, but the power of the
Legislature to effectuate social change without interference from the courts,
pursuant to [*351] art. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. n1 The
power to regulate marriage lies with the Legislature, not with the judiciary.
See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983). Today,
the court has transformed its role as protector of individual rights into the
role of creator of rights, and I respectfully dissent.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides that "the
judicial [department] shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers
. . . to the end it may be a government of laws and not of men."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
1. Equal protection. Although the court did not address the plaintiffs' gender
[***85] discrimination claim, G. L. c. 207 does not unconstitutionally
discriminate on the basis of gender. n2 A claim of gender discrimination will
lie where it is shown that differential treatment disadvantages one sex over the
other. See Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378
Mass. 342, 349-352, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979). See also United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 135 L. Ed. 2d 735, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996). General Laws c. 207
enumerates certain qualifications for obtaining a marriage license. It creates
no distinction between the sexes, but applies to men and women in precisely the
same way. It does not create any disadvantage identified with gender, as both
men and women are similarly limited to marrying a person of the opposite sex.
See Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 15-22, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977) (law
prohibiting prostitution not discriminatory [**975] based on gender because of
equal application to men and women).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 Article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, as amended by art. 106
of the Amendments, the Equal Rights Amendment, states: "Equality under the law
shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national
origin."
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***86]
Similarly, the marriage statutes do not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. As the court correctly recognizes, constitutional protections are
extended to individuals, not couples. Ante n.15. The marriage statutes do not
disqualify individuals on the basis of sexual orientation from entering into
marriage. All individuals, with certain exceptions not relevant here, are free
to marry. Whether an individual chooses not to marry because of sexual
orientation or any other reason should be of no concern to the court.
The court concludes, however, that G. L. c. 207 unconstitutionally discriminates
against the individual plaintiffs because it [*352] denies them the "right to
marry the person of one's choice" where that person is of the same sex. Ante at
. To reach this result the court relies on Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12,
18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967), and transforms "choice" into the
essential element of the institution of marriage. The Loving case did not use
the word "choice" in this manner, and it did not point to the result that the
court reaches today. In Loving, the Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional a statute that [***87] prohibited Caucasians from marrying
non-Caucasians. It concluded that the statute was intended to preserve white
supremacy and invidiously discriminated against non-Caucasians because of their
race. See id. at 11-12. The "choice" to which the Supreme Court referred was the
"choice to marry," and it concluded that with respect to the institution of
marriage, the State had no compelling interest in limiting the choice to marry
along racial lines. Id. The Supreme Court did not imply the existence of a right
to marry a person of the same sex. To the same effect is Perez v. Sharp, 32
Cal.2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948), on which the court also relies.
Unlike the Loving and Sharp cases, the Massachusetts Legislature has erected no
barrier to marriage that intentionally discriminates against anyone. Within the
institution of marriage, n3 anyone is free to marry, with certain exceptions
that are not challenged. In the absence of any discriminatory purpose, the State
's marriage statutes do not violate principles of equal protection. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976)
("invidious quality [***88] of a law claimed to be . . . discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a . . . discriminatory purpose"); Dickerson v. Attorney
Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743, 488 N.E.2d 757 (1986) (for purpose of equal protection
analysis, standard of review under State and Federal Constitutions is
identical). See also Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass
'n, supra. This court should not have invoked even the most deferential standard
of review within equal protection analysis because no individual was denied
access to the institution of marriage.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 Marriage is the civil union between a single man and a single woman. See
Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 52 (1810).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2. Due process. The marriage statutes do not impermissibly burden a right
protected by our constitutional guarantee of due [*353] process implicit in
art. 10 of our Declaration of Rights. There is no restriction on the right of
any plaintiff to enter into marriage. Each is free to marry a willing person
[***89] of the opposite sex. Cf. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 54 L. Ed.
2d 618, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978) (fundamental [**976] right to marry impermissibly
burdened by statute requiring court approval when subject to child support
order).
Substantive due process protects individual rights against unwarranted
government intrusion. See Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 673, 611 N.E.2d
204 (1993). The court states, as we have said on many occasions, that the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights may protect a right in ways that exceed the
protection afforded by the Federal Constitution. Ante at . See Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 8, 131 L. Ed. 2d 34, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995) (State courts afforded
broader protection of rights than granted by United States Constitution).
However, today the court does not fashion a remedy that affords greater
protection of a right. Instead, using the rubric of due process, it has
redefined marriage.
Although art. 10 may afford greater protection of rights than the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, our treatment of due process challenges
adheres to the same standards followed in Federal due process analysis. [***90]
See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 429 Mass. 362, 371, 708 N.E.2d 644 (1999). When
analyzing a claim that the State has impermissibly burdened an individual's
fundamental or other right or liberty interest, "we begin by sketching the
contours of the right asserted. We then inquire whether the challenged
restriction burdens that right." Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass.
629, 646, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981). Where a right deemed "fundamental" is
implicated, the challenged restriction will be upheld only if it is "narrowly
tailored to further a legitimate and compelling governmental interest." Aime v.
Commonwealth, supra at 673. To qualify as "fundamental" the asserted right must
be "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' [Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977)
(plurality opinion)] . . . and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.'"
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct.
2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1997), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325,
326, 82 L. Ed. 288, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937) [***91] (right to assisted suicide
does not fall within fundamental right to refuse medical treatment because
[*354] novel and unsupported by tradition) (citations omitted). See Three
Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 367, 455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S. 1068, 79
L. Ed. 2d 746, 104 S. Ct. 1421 (1984). Rights that are not considered
fundamental merit due process protection if they have been irrationally
burdened. See Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763,
777-779, 767 N.E.2d 549 & n.14 (2002).
Although this court did not state that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right
worthy of strict scrutiny protection, it nonetheless deemed it a
constitutionally protected right by applying rational basis review. Before
applying any level of constitutional analysis there must be a recognized right
at stake. Same-sex marriage, or the "right to marry the person of one's choice"
as the court today defines that right, does not fall within the fundamental
right to marry. Same-sex marriage is not "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history," and the court does [***92] not suggest that it is. Except for the
occasional isolated decision in recent years, see, e.g., Baker v. State, 170 Vt.
194, 744 A.2d 864 (1999), same-sex marriage is not a right, fundamental or
otherwise, recognized in this country. Just one example of the Legislature's
refusal to recognize same-sex marriage can be found in a section of the
legislation [**977] amending G. L. c. 151B to prohibit discrimination in the
workplace on the basis of sexual orientation, which states: "Nothing in this act
shall be construed so as to legitimize or validate a 'homosexual marriage'. . .
." St. 1989, c. 516, § 19. In this Commonwealth and in this country, the roots
of the institution of marriage are deeply set in history as a civil union
between a single man and a single woman. There is no basis for the court to
recognize same-sex marriage as a constitutionally protected right.
3. Remedy. The remedy that the court has fashioned both in the name of equal
protection and due process exceeds the bounds of judicial restraint mandated by
art. 30. The remedy that construes gender-specific language as gender-neutral
amounts to a statutory revision that replaces the intent of the Legislature
[***93] with that of the court. Article 30 permits the court to apply
principles of equal protection and to modify statutory language only if
legislative intent is preserved. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chou, 433 Mass. 229,
238-239, 741 N.E.2d 17 (2001) (judicial [*355] rewriting of gender language
permissible only when Legislature intended to include both men and women). See
also Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 670, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980). Here, the
alteration of the gender-specific language alters precisely what the Legislature
unambiguously intended to preserve, the marital rights of single men and women.
Such a dramatic change in social institutions must remain at the behest of the
people through the democratic process.
Where the application of equal protection principles do not permit rewriting a
statute in a manner that preserves the intent of the Legislature, we do not
rewrite the statute. In Dalli v. Board of Educ., 358 Mass. 753, 267 N.E.2d 219
(1971), the court refused to rewrite a statute in a manner that would include
unintended individuals. "To attempt to interpret this [statute] as including
those in the category of the plaintiff [***94] would be to engage in a judicial
enlargement of the clear statutory language beyond the limit of our judicial
function. We have traditionally and consistently declined to trespass on
legislative territory in deference to the time tested wisdom of the separation
of powers as expressed in art. [30] of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of Massachusetts even when it appeared that a highly desirable and
just result might thus be achieved." Id. at 759. Recently, in Connors v. Boston,
430 Mass. 31, 714 N.E.2d 335 (1999), we refused to expand health insurance
coverage to include domestic partners because such an expansion was within the
province of the Legislature, where policy affecting family relationships is most
appropriate and frequently considered. Id. at 42-43. Principles of equal
protection do not permit the marriage statutes to be changed in the manner that
we have seen today.
This court has previously exercised the judicial restraint mandated by art. 30
and declined to extend due process protection to rights not traditionally
coveted, despite recognition of their social importance. See Tobin's Case, 424
Mass. 250, 252-253, 675 N.E.2d 781 (1997) [***95] (receiving workers'
compensation benefits not fundamental right); Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of
Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 129, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (1995) (declaring education not
fundamental right); Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human
Servs., 414 Mass. 551, 565, 609 N.E.2d 447 (1993) [*356] (no fundamental right
to receive mental health services); Matter of Tocci, 413 Mass. 542, 548 n.4, 600
N.E.2d 577 (1992) (no fundamental right to practice law); Commonwealth v. Henry
's Drywall Co., 366 Mass. 539, 542, 320 N.E.2d 911 (1974) (no [**978]
fundamental right to pursue one's business). Courts have authority to recognize
rights that are supported by the Constitution and history, but the power to
create novel rights is reserved for the people through the democratic and
legislative processes.
Likewise, the Supreme Court exercises restraint in the application of
substantive due process "'because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in
this unchartered area are scarce and open-ended.' [Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 125, 117 L. Ed. 2d 261, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992).] By extending
constitutional [***96] protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we,
to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action. We must therefore 'exercise the utmost care whenever we are
asked to break new ground in this field,' [id.], lest the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of the
Members of this Court, Moore [v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502, 52 L. Ed. 2d
531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977)] (plurality opinion)." Washington v. Glucksberg,
supra at 720.
The court has extruded a new right from principles of substantive due process,
and in doing so it has distorted the meaning and purpose of due process. The
purpose of substantive due process is to protect existing rights, not to create
new rights. Its aim is to thwart government intrusion, not invite it. The court
asserts that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights serves to guard against
government intrusion into each individual's sphere of privacy. Ante at .
Similarly, the Supreme Court has called for increased due process protection
when individual privacy and intimacy are threatened by unnecessary [***97]
government imposition. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 123 S.
Ct. 2472 (2003) (private nature of sexual behavior implicates increased due
process protection); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349, 92 S.
Ct. 1029 (1972) (privacy protection extended to procreation decisions within
nonmarital context); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85
S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (due process invoked because of intimate nature of
procreation decisions). These cases, along with the Moe case, focus on the
threat to privacy when government seeks to regulate the most intimate activity
behind bedroom doors. The statute in question does not seek to regulate intimate
activity [*357] within an intimate relationship, but merely gives formal
recognition to a particular marriage. The State has respected the private lives
of the plaintiffs, and has done nothing to intrude in the relationships that
each of the plaintiff couples enjoy. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, supra at 2484 (case
"does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter"). Ironically, [***98] by
extending the marriage laws to same-sex couples the court has turned substantive
due process on its head and used it to interject government into the plaintiffs'
lives.
SOSMAN, J. (dissenting, with whom Spina and Cordy, JJ., join). In applying the
rational basis test to any challenged statutory scheme, the issue is not whether
the Legislature's rationale behind that scheme is persuasive to us, but only
whether it satisfies a minimal threshold of rationality. Today, rather than
apply that test, the court announces that, because it is persuaded that there
are no differences between same-sex and opposite-sex couples, the Legislature
has no rational basis for treating them differently with respect to the granting
of marriage [**979] licenses. n1 Reduced to its essence, the court's opinion
concludes that, because same-sex couples are now raising children, and
withholding the benefits of civil marriage from their union makes it harder for
them to raise those children, the State must therefore provide the benefits of
civil marriage to same-sex couples just as it does to opposite-sex couples. Of
course, many people are raising children outside the confines of traditional
marriage, and, by [***99] definition, those children are being deprived of the
various benefits that would flow if they were being raised in a household with
married parents. That does not mean that the [*358] Legislature must accord
the full benefits of marital status on every household raising children. Rather,
the Legislature need only have some rational basis for concluding that, at
present, those alternate family structures have not yet been conclusively shown
to be the equivalent of the marital family structure that has established itself
as a successful one over a period of centuries. People are of course at liberty
to raise their children in various family structures, as long as they are not
literally harming their children by doing so. See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649,
668-670, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002) (Sosman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1189, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1022, 123 S. Ct. 1259 (2003). That does not mean that the
State is required to provide identical forms of encouragement, endorsement, and
support to all of the infinite variety of household structures that a free
society permits.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 The one difference that the court acknowledges -- that sexual relations
between persons of the same sex does not result in pregnancy and childbirth --
it immediately brushes aside on the theory that civil marriage somehow has
nothing to do with begetting children. Ante at - . For the reasons explained in
detail in Justice Cordy's dissent, in which I join, the reasons justifying the
civil marriage laws are inextricably linked to the fact that human sexual
intercourse between a man and a woman frequently results in pregnancy and
childbirth. Indeed, as Justice Cordy outlines, that fact lies at the core of why
society fashioned the institution of marriage in the first place. Post at
(Cordy, J., dissenting).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***100]
Based on our own philosophy of child rearing, and on our observations of the
children being raised by same-sex couples to whom we are personally close, we
may be of the view that what matters to children is not the gender, or sexual
orientation, or even the number of the adults who raise them, but rather whether
those adults provide the children with a nurturing, stable, safe, consistent,
and supportive environment in which to mature. Same-sex couples can provide
their children with the requisite nurturing, stable, safe, consistent, and
supportive environment in which to mature, just as opposite-sex couples do. It
is therefore understandable that the court might view the traditional definition
of marriage as an unnecessary anachronism, rooted in historical prejudices that
modern society has in large measure rejected and biological limitations that
modern science has overcome.
It is not, however, our assessment that matters. Conspicuously absent from the
court's opinion today is any acknowledgment that the attempts at scientific
study of the ramifications of raising children in same-sex couple households are
themselves in their infancy and have so far produced inconclusive and
conflicting [***101] results. Notwithstanding our belief that gender and sexual
orientation of parents should not matter to the success of the child rearing
venture, studies to date reveal that there are still some observable differences
between children raised by opposite-sex couples and children raised by same-sex
couples. [*359] See post at - (Cordy, J., dissenting). [**980]
Interpretation of the data gathered by those studies then becomes clouded by the
personal and political beliefs of the investigators, both as to whether the
differences identified are positive or negative, and as to the untested
explanations of what might account for those differences. (This is hardly the
first time in history that the ostensible steel of the scientific method has
melted and buckled under the intense heat of political and religious passions.)
Even in the absence of bias or political agenda behind the various studies of
children raised by same-sex couples, the most neutral and strict application of
scientific principles to this field would be constrained by the limited period
of observation that has been available. Gay and lesbian couples living together
openly, and official recognition of them as their children's sole parents,
[***102] comprise a very recent phenomenon, and the recency of that phenomenon
has not yet permitted any study of how those children fare as adults and at best
minimal study of how they fare during their adolescent years. The Legislature
can rationally view the state of the scientific evidence as unsettled on the
critical question it now faces: Are families headed by same-sex parents equally
successful in rearing children from infancy to adulthood as families headed by
parents of opposite sexes? Our belief that children raised by same-sex couples
should fare the same as children raised in traditional families is just that: a
passionately held but utterly untested belief. The Legislature is not required
to share that belief but may, as the creator of the institution of civil
marriage, wish to see the proof before making a fundamental alteration to that
institution.
Although ostensibly applying the rational basis test to the civil marriage
statutes, it is abundantly apparent that the court is in fact applying some
undefined stricter standard to assess the constitutionality of the marriage
statutes' exclusion of same-sex couples. While avoiding any express conclusion
as to any of the proffered [***103] routes by which that exclusion would be
subjected to a test of strict scrutiny -- infringement of a fundamental right,
discrimination based on gender, or discrimination against gays and lesbians as a
suspect classification -- the opinion repeatedly alludes to those concepts in a
prolonged and eloquent prelude before articulating its view that the exclusion
lacks [*360] even a rational basis. See, e.g., ante at (noting that State
Constitution is "more protective of individual liberty and equality," demands
"broader protection for fundamental rights," and is "less tolerant of government
intrusion into the protected spheres of private life" than Federal
Constitution); ante at (describing decision to marry and choice of marital
partner as "among life's momentous acts of self-definition"); ante at -
(repeated references to "right to marry" as "fundamental"); ante at - (repeated
comparisons to statutes prohibiting interracial marriage, which were predicated
on suspect classification of race); ante at - (characterizing ban on same-sex
marriage as "invidious" discrimination that "deprives individuals of access to
an institution of fundamental legal, personal, and social significance"
[***104] and again noting that Massachusetts Constitution "protects matters of
personal liberty against government incursion" more zealously than Federal
Constitution); ante at (characterizing "whom to marry, how to express sexual
intimacy, and whether and how to establish a family" as "among the most basic of
every individual's liberty and due process rights"); id. ("liberty interest in
choosing whether and whom to marry would be hollow" if Commonwealth could
"foreclose an individual from freely choosing the person" to marry); ante at
[**981] (opining that in "overlapping realms of personal autonomy, marriage,
family life, and child rearing," characterized as "fundamentally private areas
of life," court uses "integrated" analysis instead of "narrow focus"). See also
ante at n.29 (suggesting that prohibition on same-sex marriage "imposes limits
on personal beliefs"); ante at n.31 (suggesting that "total deference" to
Legislature in this case would be equivalent to "stripping" judiciary "of its
constitutional authority to decide challenges" in such areas as forced
sterilization, antimiscegenation statutes, and abortion, even though all cited
examples pertain to fundamental rights [***105] analyzed under strict scrutiny,
not under rational basis test); ante at (civil marriage as "a right of
fundamental importance"); ante at (noting State policy of "preventing
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation"); id. (prohibition against
same-sex marriage inconsistent with "gender-neutral laws promoting stable
families," and "rooted in [*361] persistent prejudices against" homosexuals);
ante at (prohibition against same-sex marriage "violated the basic premises of
individual liberty"). In short, while claiming to apply a mere rational basis
test, the court's opinion works up an enormous head of steam by repeated
invocations of avenues by which to subject the statute to strict scrutiny,
apparently hoping that that head of steam will generate momentum sufficient to
propel the opinion across the yawning chasm of the very deferential rational
basis test.
Shorn of these emotion-laden invocations, the opinion ultimately opines that the
Legislature is acting irrationally when it grants benefits to a proven
successful family structure while denying the same benefits to a recent, perhaps
promising, but essentially untested alternate family structure. Placed in a
[***106] more neutral context, the court would never find any irrationality in
such an approach. For example, if the issue were government subsidies and tax
benefits promoting use of an established technology for energy efficient
heating, the court would find no equal protection or due process violation in
the Legislature's decision not to grant the same benefits to an inventor or
manufacturer of some new, alternative technology who did not yet have sufficient
data to prove that that new technology was just as good as the established
technology. That the early results from preliminary testing of the new
technology might look very promising, or that the theoretical underpinnings of
the new technology might appear flawless, would not make it irrational for the
Legislature to grant subsidies and tax breaks to the established technology and
deny them to the still unproved newcomer in the field. While programs that
affect families and children register higher on our emotional scale than
programs affecting energy efficiency, our standards for what is or is not
"rational" should not be bent by those emotional tugs. Where, as here, there is
no ground for applying strict scrutiny, the emotionally compelling [***107]
nature of the subject matter should not affect the manner in which we apply the
rational basis test.
Or, to the extent that the court is going to invoke such emotion-laden and
value-laden rhetoric as a means of heightening the degree of scrutiny to be
applied, the same form of rhetoric can be employed to justify the Legislature's
proceeding with extreme caution in this area. In considering whether the [*362]
Legislature has a rational reason for postponing a dramatic change to the
definition of marriage, it is surely pertinent to the inquiry to recognize that
this proffered change affects not just a load-bearing wall of our social
structure but the very cornerstone of that structure. [**982] See post at -
(Cordy, J., dissenting). Before making a fundamental alteration to that
cornerstone, it is eminently rational for the Legislature to require a high
degree of certainty as to the precise consequences of that alteration, to make
sure that it can be done safely, without either temporary or lasting damage to
the structural integrity of the entire edifice. The court today blithely assumes
that there are no such dangers and that it is safe to proceed (see ante at -, an
assumption that is not [***108] supported by anything more than the court's
blind faith that it is so.
More importantly, it is not our confidence in the lack of adverse consequences
that is at issue, or even whether that confidence is justifiable. The issue is
whether it is rational to reserve judgment on whether this change can be made at
this time without damaging the institution of marriage or adversely affecting
the critical role it has played in our society. Absent consensus on the issue
(which obviously does not exist), or unanimity amongst scientists studying the
issue (which also does not exist), or a more prolonged period of observation of
this new family structure (which has not yet been possible), it is rational for
the Legislature to postpone any redefinition of marriage that would include
same-sex couples until such time as it is certain that that redefinition will
not have unintended and undesirable social consequences. Through the political
process, the people may decide when the benefits of extending civil marriage to
same-sex couples have been shown to outweigh whatever risks -- be they palpable
or ephemeral -- are involved. However minimal the risks of that redefinition of
marriage may seem to [***109] us from our vantage point, it is not up to us to
decide what risks society must run, and it is inappropriate for us to arrogate
that power to ourselves merely because we are confident that "it is the right
thing to do." Ante at (Greaney, J., concurring).
As a matter of social history, today's opinion may represent a great turning
point that many will hail as a tremendous step [*363] toward a more just
society. As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, however, the case stands
as an aberration. To reach the result it does, the court has tortured the
rational basis test beyond recognition. I fully appreciate the strength of the
temptation to find this particular law unconstitutional - there is much to be
said for the argument that excluding gay and lesbian couples from the benefits
of civil marriage is cruelly unfair and hopelessly outdated; the inability to
marry has a profound impact on the personal lives of committed gay and lesbian
couples (and their children) to whom we are personally close (our friends,
neighbors, family members, classmates, and co-workers); and our resolution of
this issue takes place under the intense glare of national and international
publicity. Speaking [***110] metaphorically, these factors have combined to
turn the case before us into a "perfect storm" of a constitutional question. In
my view, however, such factors make it all the more imperative that we adhere
precisely and scrupulously to the established guideposts of our constitutional
jurisprudence, a jurisprudence that makes the rational basis test an extremely
deferential one that focuses on the rationality, not the persuasiveness, of the
potential justifications for the classifications in the legislative scheme. I
trust that, once this particular "storm" clears, we will return to the rational
basis test as it has always been understood and applied. Applying that
deferential test in the manner it is customarily applied, the exclusion of gay
and lesbian couples from the institution of civil marriage passes constitutional
muster. I respectfully dissent.
[**983] CORDY, J. (dissenting, with whom Spina and Sosman, JJ., join). The
court's opinion concludes that the Department of Public Health has failed to
identify any "constitutionally adequate reason" for limiting civil marriage to
opposite-sex unions, and that there is no "reasonable relationship" between a
disqualification of same-sex couples [***111] who wish to enter into a civil
marriage and the protection of public health, safety, or general welfare.
Consequently, it holds that the marriage statute cannot withstand scrutiny under
the Massachusetts Constitution. Because I find these conclusions to be
unsupportable in light of the nature of the rights and regulations at issue, the
presumption [*364] of constitutional validity and significant deference
afforded to legislative enactments, and the "undesirability of the judiciary
substituting its notions of correct policy for that of a popularly elected
Legislature" responsible for making such policy, Zayre Corp. v. Attorney Gen.,
372 Mass. 423, 433, 362 N.E.2d 878 (1977), I respectfully dissent. Although it
may be desirable for many reasons to extend to same-sex couples the benefits and
burdens of civil marriage (and the plaintiffs have made a powerfully reasoned
case for that extension), that decision must be made by the Legislature, not the
court.
If a statute either impairs the exercise of a fundamental right protected by the
due process or liberty provisions of our State Constitution, or discriminates
based on a constitutionally suspect classification such as [***112] sex, it
will be subject to strict scrutiny when its validity is challenged. See Blixt v.
Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 655-656, 660-661, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002), cert. denied,
537 U.S. 1189, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1022, 123 S. Ct. 1259 (2003) (fundamental right);
Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 666, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980) (sex-based
classification). If it does neither, a statute "will be upheld if it is
'rationally related to a legitimate State purpose.'" Hallett v. Wrentham, 398
Mass. 550, 557, 499 N.E.2d 1189 (1986), quoting Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373
Mass. 645, 649, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977). This test, referred to in State and
Federal constitutional jurisprudence as the "rational basis test," n1 is
virtually identical in substance and effect to the test applied to a law
promulgated under the State's broad police powers (pursuant to which the
marriage statutes and most other licensing and regulatory laws are enacted):
that is, the law is valid if it is reasonably related to the protection of
public health, safety, or general welfare. See, e.g., Leigh v. Board of
Registration in Nursing, 395 Mass. 670, 682-683, 481 N.E.2d 1347 (1985) [***113]
(applying rational basis review to question of State exercise of police power).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 The rational basis standard applied under the Massachusetts Constitution and
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is the same. See
Chebacco Liquor Mart, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 429 Mass. 721,
722-723, 711 N.E.2d 135 (1999).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The Massachusetts marriage statute does not impair the exercise of a recognized
fundamental right, or discriminate on the basis of sex in violation of the equal
rights amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. Consequently, it is subject
to [*365] review only to determine whether it satisfies the rational basis
test. Because a conceivable rational basis exists upon which the Legislature
could conclude that the marriage statute furthers the legitimate State purpose
of ensuring, promoting, and supporting an optimal social structure for the
bearing and raising of children, it is a valid exercise of the State's police
power.
A. Limiting marriage to the [***114] union of one man and one woman does not
impair [**984] the exercise of a fundamental right. Civil marriage is an
institution created by the State. In Massachusetts, the marriage statutes are
derived from English common law, see Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 530, 534
(1807), and were first enacted in colonial times. Commonwealth v. Munson, 127
Mass. 459, 460 (1879). They were enacted to secure public interests and not for
religious purposes or to promote personal interests or aspirations. (See
discussion infra at - ). As the court notes in its opinion, the institution of
marriage is "the legal union of a man and woman as husband and wife," ante at,
and it has always been so under Massachusetts law, colonial or otherwise.
The plaintiffs contend that because the right to choose to marry is a
"fundamental" right, the right to marry the person of one's choice, including a
member of the same sex, must also be a "fundamental" right. While the court
stops short of deciding that the right to marry someone of the same sex is
"fundamental" such that strict scrutiny must be applied to any statute that
impairs it, it nevertheless agrees with the plaintiffs [***115] that the right
to choose to marry is of fundamental importance ("among the most basic" of every
person's "liberty and due process rights") and would be "hollow" if an
individual was foreclosed from "freely choosing the person with whom to share .
. . the . . . institution of civil marriage." Ante at . Hence, it concludes that
a marriage license cannot be denied to an individual who wishes to marry someone
of the same sex. In reaching this result the court has transmuted the "right" to
marry into a right to change the institution of marriage itself. This feat of
reasoning succeeds only if one accepts the proposition that the definition of
the institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman is merely
"conclusory" (as suggested, ante at [Greaney, J., concurring]), rather than the
basis on which the [*366] "right" to partake in it has been deemed to be of
fundamental importance. In other words, only by assuming that "marriage"
includes the union of two persons of the same sex does the court conclude that
restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples infringes on the "right" of
same-sex couples to "marry." n2
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n2 The same semantic sleight of hand could transform every other restriction on
marriage into an infringement of a right of fundamental importance. For example,
if one assumes that a group of mature, consenting, committed adults can form a
"marriage," the prohibition on polygamy (G. L. c. 207, § 4), infringes on their
"right" to "marry." In legal analysis as in mathematics, it is fundamentally
erroneous to assume the truth of the very thing that is to be proved.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***116]
The plaintiffs ground their contention that they have a fundamental right to
marry a person of the same sex in a long line of Supreme Court decisions, e.g.,
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987); Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct. 1817 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 86 L. Ed. 1655, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942); that discuss the
importance of marriage. In context, all of these decisions and their discussions
are about the "fundamental" nature of the institution of marriage as it has
existed and been understood in this country, not as the court has redefined it
today. Even in that context, its "fundamental" nature is derivative of the
nature of the interests that underlie or are associated with it. n3 An [**985]
examination of those interests reveals that they are either not shared by
same-sex couples or not implicated by the marriage statutes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 Casting the right to civil marriage as a "fundamental right" in the
constitutional sense is somewhat peculiar. It is not referred to as such in
either the State or Federal Constitution, and unlike other recognized
fundamental rights (such as the right to procreate, the right to be free of
government restraint, or the right to refuse medical treatment), civil marriage
is wholly a creature of State statute. If by enacting a civil marriage statutory
scheme Massachusetts has created a fundamental right, then it could never repeal
its own statute without violating the fundamental rights of its inhabitants.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***117]
Supreme Court cases that have described marriage or the right to marry as
"fundamental" have focused primarily on the underlying interest of every
individual in procreation, which, historically, could only legally occur within
the construct of marriage because sexual intercourse outside of marriage was a
[*367] criminal act. n4 In Skinner v. Oklahoma, supra, the first case to
characterize marriage as a "fundamental" right, the Supreme Court stated, as its
rationale for striking down a sterilization statute, that "marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence of the race." Id. at 541. In
concluding that a sterilized individual "is forever deprived of a basic liberty,
" id., the Court was obviously referring to procreation rather than marriage, as
this court recognized in Matter of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 560, 432 N.E.2d 712
(1982). Similarly, in Loving v. Virginia, supra, in which the United States
Supreme Court struck down Virginia's antimiscegenation statute, the Court
implicitly linked marriage with procreation in describing marriage as
"fundamental to our very existence." Id. at 12. [***118] In Zablocki v.
Redhail, supra, the Court expressly linked the right to marry with the right to
procreate, concluding that "if [the plaintiff's] right to procreate means
anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in
which the State . . . allows sexual relations legally to take place." Id. at 386
. Once again, in Turner v. Safley, supra, striking a State regulation that
curtailed the right of an inmate to marry, the Court included among the
important attributes of such marriages the "expectation that [the marriage]
ultimately will be fully consummated." 482 U.S. at 96. See Milford v. Worcester,
7 Mass. 48, 52 (1810) (purpose of marriage is "to regulate, chasten, and refine,
the intercourse between the sexes; and to multiply [and] preserve . . . the
species"). Because same-sex couples are unable to procreate on their own, any
right to marriage they may possess cannot be based on their interest in
procreation, which has been essential to the Supreme Court's denomination of the
right to marry as fundamental.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 For example, see G. L. c. 272, §§ 14 and 18, the Massachusetts adultery and
fornication statutes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***119]
Supreme Court cases recognizing a right to privacy in intimate decision-making,
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, supra (striking down statute prohibiting use of
contraceptives); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705
(1973) (striking down statute criminalizing abortion), have also focused
primarily on sexual relations and the decision whether or not to procreate, and
have refused to recognize an "unlimited right" to privacy. Id. at 154.
Massachusetts courts have been no more willing than the Federal [*368] courts
to adopt a "universal[]" "privacy doctrine," Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 Mass.
63, 67, 375 N.E.2d 688 (1978), or to derive "controversial 'new' rights from the
Constitution." Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 674 n.10, 611 N.E.2d 204
(1993).
[**986] What the Griswold Court found "repulsive to the notions of privacy
surrounding the marriage relationship" was the prospect of "allowing the police
to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use
of contraceptives." Griswold v. Connecticut, supra at 485-486. See Moe v.
Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 658, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981), [***120]
quoting L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 924 (1978) (finding it "difficult
to imagine a clearer case of bodily intrusion" than being forced to bear a
child). When Justice Goldberg spoke of "marital relations" in the context of
finding it "difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a
husband and wife's marital relationship," Griswold v. Connecticut, supra at 495
(Goldberg, J., concurring), he was obviously referring to sexual relations. n5
Similarly, in Lawrence v. Texas, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), it
was the criminalization of private sexual behavior that the Court found
violative of the petitioners' liberty interest.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5 While the facts of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510,
85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965), involved a married couple, later decisions clarify that
its holding was not premised on the marriage relationship. See Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687, 52 L. Ed. 2d 675, 97 S. Ct. 2010
(1977) (stating that Griswold rested on the "right of the individual" to be free
from governmental interference with child-bearing decisions [emphasis in
original]); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454, 31 L. Ed. 2d 349, 92 S.
Ct. 1029 (1972) (same).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***121]
In Massachusetts jurisprudence, protected decisions generally have been limited
to those concerning "whether or not to beget or bear a child," Matter of Moe,
385 Mass. 555, 564, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (see Opinion of the Justices, 423
Mass. 1201, 1234-1235, 668 N.E.2d 738 [1996] ["focus of (the Griswold and Roe
cases) and the cases following them has been the intrusion . . . into the
especially intimate aspects of a person's life implicated in procreation and
childbearing"]); how to raise a child, see Care & Protection of Robert, 408
Mass. 52, 58, 60, 556 N.E.2d 993 (1990); or whether or not to accept medical
treatment, see Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986); Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373
Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), none of which is at issue here. See also
Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 301, 318 N.E.2d 478 (1974) (statute
punishing unnatural and [*369] lascivious acts does not apply to sexual
conduct engaged in by adults in private, in light of "articulation of the
constitutional [***122] right of an individual to be free from government
regulation of certain sex related activities").
The marriage statute, which regulates only the act of obtaining a marriage
license, does not implicate privacy in the sense that it has found
constitutional protection under Massachusetts and Federal law. Cf. Commonwealth
v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 14, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977) (solicitation of prostitution
"while in a place to which the public had access" implicated no
"constitutionally protected rights of privacy"); Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., supra
at 68 (right to privacy, at most, protects conduct "limited more or less to the
hearth"). It does not intrude on any right that the plaintiffs have to privacy
in their choices regarding procreation, an intimate partner or sexual relations.
n6 The plaintiffs' right to privacy in [**987] such matters does not require
that the State officially endorse their choices in order for the right to be
constitutionally vindicated.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 Contrast Lawrence v. Texas, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), in
which the United States Supreme Court struck down the Texas criminal sodomy
statute because it constituted State intrusion on some of these very choices.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***123]
Although some of the privacy cases also speak in terms of personal autonomy, no
court has ever recognized such an open- ended right. "That many of the rights
and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy
does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate,
and personal decisions are so protected . . . ." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 727, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1997). Such
decisions are protected not because they are important, intimate, and personal,
but because the right or liberty at stake is "so deeply rooted in our history
and traditions, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered
liberty" that it is protected by due process. Id. Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has concluded that while the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment is
fundamental, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278, 111 L.
Ed. 2d 224, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990), because it is deeply rooted in our nation's
history and tradition, the equally personal and profound decision to commit
suicide is not because of the absence of such roots. Washington v. Glucksberg,
supra. [***124] [*370] While the institution of marriage is deeply rooted in
the history and traditions of our country and our State, the right to marry
someone of the same sex is not. No matter how personal or intimate a decision to
marry someone of the same sex might be, the right to make it is not guaranteed
by the right of personal autonomy.
The protected right to freedom of association, in the sense of freedom of choice
"to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships," Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462, 104 S. Ct. 3244
(1984) (as an element of liberty or due process rather than free speech), is
similarly limited and unimpaired by the marriage statute. As recognized by the
Supreme Court, that right affords protection only to "certain kinds of highly
personal relationships," id. at 618, such as those between husband and wife,
parent and child, and among close relatives, id. at 619, that "have played a
critical role in the culture and traditions of the Nation," id. at 618-619, and
are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-499, 503, 52 L. Ed. 2d 531, 97 S. Ct. 1932 (1977)
[***125] (distinguishing on this basis between family and nonfamily
relationships). Unlike opposite-sex marriages, which have deep historic roots,
or the parent-child relationship, which reflects a "strong tradition" founded on
"the history and culture of Western civilization" and "is now established beyond
debate as an enduring American tradition," Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S. Ct. 1526 (1972); or extended family relationships,
which have been "honored throughout our history," Moore v. East Cleveland, supra
at 505, same-sex relationships, although becoming more accepted, are certainly
not so "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" as to warrant such
enhanced constitutional protection.
Although "expressions of emotional support and public commitment" have been
recognized as among the attributes of marriage, which, "[t]aken together . . .
form a constitutionally protected marital relationship" (emphasis added), Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95, 96, 96 L. Ed. 2d 64, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987), those
interests, standing alone, are not the source of a fundamental right to marry.
While damage [***126] to one's "status in the community" may be [**988]
sufficient harm to confer standing to sue, Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663,
667, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980), such status has never been recognized as a [*371]
fundamental right. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S.
Ct. 1155 (1976) (mere damage to reputation does not constitute deprivation of
"liberty").
Finally, the constitutionally protected interest in child rearing, recognized in
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 43 S. Ct. 625 (1923);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 69 L. Ed. 1070, 45 S. Ct.
571 (1925); and Care & Protection of Robert, supra at 58, 60, is not implicated
or infringed by the marriage statute here. The fact that the plaintiffs cannot
marry has no bearing on their independently protected constitutional rights as
parents which, as with opposite-sex parents, are limited only by their continued
fitness and the best interests of their children. Bezio v. Patenaude, 381 Mass.
563, 579, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980) (courts may not use parent's sexual orientation
as reason to deny child custody).
[***127] Because the rights and interests discussed above do not afford the
plaintiffs any fundamental right that would be impaired by a statute limiting
marriage to members of the opposite sex, they have no fundamental right to be
declared "married" by the State.
Insofar as the right to marry someone of the same sex is neither found in the
unique historical context of our Constitution n7 nor compelled by the meaning
ascribed by this court to the liberty and due process protections contained
within it, should the court nevertheless recognize it as a fundamental right?
The consequences of deeming a right to be "fundamental" are profound, and this
court, as well as the Supreme Court, has been very cautious in recognizing them.
n8 Such caution [**989] is required by separation of powers principles. If a
right is found [*372] to be "fundamental," it is, to a great extent, removed
from "the arena of public debate and legislative action"; utmost care must be
taken when breaking new ground in this field "lest the liberty protected by the
Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences of
[judges]." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117
S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302 (1997). [***128]
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n7 The statutes from which our current marriage laws derive were enacted prior
to or shortly after the adoption of our Constitution in 1780, and "may well be
considered . . . as affording some light in regard to the views and intentions
of [the Constitution's] founders." Merriam v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 375
Mass. 246, 253, 376 N.E.2d 838 (1978).n8 Tobin's Case, 424 Mass. 250, 252-253,
675 N.E.2d 781 (1997) (no fundamental right to receive workers' compensation
benefits); Doe v. Superintendent of Schs. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 129, 653
N.E.2d 1088 (1995) (no fundamental right to education); Williams v. Secretary of
the Executive Office of Human Servs., 414 Mass. 551, 565, 609 N.E.2d 447 (1993)
(no fundamental right to receive mental health services); Matter of Tocci, 413
Mass. 542, 548 n.4, 600 N.E.2d 577 (1992) (no fundamental right to practice
law); Rushworth v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 413 Mass. 265, 269 n.5, 596
N.E.2d 340 (1992) (no fundamental right to operate motor vehicle); English v.
New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 429, 541 N.E.2d 329 (1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1056, 107 L. Ed. 2d 949, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990) (no fundamental
right to recover tort damages); Commonwealth v. Henry's Drywall Co., 366 Mass.
539, 542, 320 N.E.2d 911 (1974) (no fundamental right to pursue one's business).
Cf. Aime v. Commonwealth, 414 Mass. 667, 674 n.10, 611 N.E.2d 204 (1993)
(recognizing right to be free from physical restraint "does not involve judicial
derivation of controversial 'new' rights from the Constitution"). See generally
Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servs., supra at 566
(recognizing fundamental right to receive mental health services "would
represent an enormous and unwarranted extension of the judiciary into the
[Department of Mental Health]'s authority"); Ford v. Grafton, 44 Mass. App. Ct.
715, 730-731, 693 N.E.2d 1047, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1040, 142 L. Ed. 2d 534,
119 S. Ct. 591 (1998), quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 203, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989) ("people of
Massachusetts may choose by legislation to [provide remedies for "grievous harm
"] . . . however, 'they should not have [such remedies] thrust upon them by this
Court's expansion of the Due Process Clause . . .").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***129]
"To rein in" the otherwise potentially unlimited scope of substantive due
process rights, id. at 722, both Federal and Massachusetts courts have
recognized as "fundamental" only those "rights and liberties which are,
objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' [Moore v.
East Cleveland, supra at 503] . . . and 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.'" Id. at 720-721, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 82
L. Ed. 288, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937). See Dutil, petitioner, 437 Mass. 9, 13, 768
N.E.2d 1055 (2002) (same). In the area of family-related rights in particular,
the Supreme Court has emphasized that the "Constitution protects the sanctity of
the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted."
Moore v. East Cleveland, supra. n9
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n9 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-123, 127, 105 L. Ed. 2d 91,
109 S. Ct. 2333 & n.3 (1989) (plurality opinion) (limits on substantive due
process rights center on "respect for the teachings of history"); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965) (Harlan,
J., concurring) (same).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***130]
Applying this limiting principle, the Supreme Court, as noted above, declined to
recognize a fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide, which would have
required "reversing centuries of legal doctrine and practice, and striking down
the considered policy choice of almost every State." [*373] Washington v.
Glucksberg, supra at 723. While recognizing that public attitudes toward
assisted suicide are currently the subject of "earnest and profound debate," the
Court nevertheless left the continuation and resolution of that debate to the
political arena, "as it should be in a democratic society." Id. at 719, 735.
Similarly, Massachusetts courts have declined to recognize rights that are not
so deeply rooted. n10 As this court noted in [**990] considering whether to
recognize a right of terminally ill patients to refuse life-prolonging
treatment, "the law always lags behind the most advanced thinking in every area,
" and must await "some common ground, some consensus." Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 737, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977),
quoting Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 Annals Internal Med. Supp. 7,
15, 17 [***131] (1967). See Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 662-663 n.22, 774
N.E.2d 1052 (2002) ("social consensus about family relationships is relevant to
the constitutional limits on State intervention").
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n10 Compare Curtis v. School Comm. of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749, 756, 652 N.E.2d
580 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1067, 133 L. Ed. 2d 700, 116 S. Ct. 753
(1996), quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 92 S.
Ct. 1526 (1972) ("primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their
children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition");
Aime v. Commonwealth, supra at 676 ("right to be free from governmental
detention and restraint is firmly embedded in the history of Anglo-American law
"); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d 626
(1986) (right to make decisions to accept or reject medical treatment "has its
roots deep in our history" and "has come to be widely recognized and respected
"); and Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 649, 417 N.E.2d 387
(1981) (characterizing decision whether to bear a child as "holding a
particularly important place in the history of the right of privacy" and finding
"something approaching consensus" on right to refuse unwanted infringement of
bodily integrity), with Trigones v. Attorney Gen., 420 Mass. 859, 863, 652
N.E.2d 893 (1995), quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 120 L. Ed.
2d 353, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992) (upholding statute that does not "offend some
principle of justice so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as
to be ranked fundamental"); Three Juveniles v. Commonwealth, 390 Mass. 357, 364,
455 N.E.2d 1203 (1983), cert. denied sub nom. Keefe v. Massachusetts, 465 U.S.
1068, 79 L. Ed. 2d 746, 104 S. Ct. 1421 (1984) (declining to find fundamental
right to child-parent privilege where "neither Congress nor the Legislature of
any State has seen fit to adopt a rule granting [such] a privilege . . .");
Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 174, 449 N.E.2d 357 (1983), quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973) (declining to
recognize right not "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***132]
This is not to say that a statute that has no rational basis must nevertheless
be upheld as long as it is of ancient origin. However, "the long history of a
certain practice . . . and its [*374] acceptance as an uncontroversial part of
our national and State tradition do suggest that [the court] should reflect
carefully before striking it down." Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 378 Mass.
550, 557, 392 N.E.2d 1195 (1979). As this court has recognized, the "fact that a
challenged practice 'is followed by a large number of states . . . is plainly
worth considering in determining whether the practice "offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental."'" Commonwealth v. Kostka, 370 Mass. 516, 533, 350 N.E.2d 444
(1976), quoting Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798, 96 L. Ed. 1302, 72 S. Ct.
1002 (1952).
Although public attitudes toward marriage in general and same-sex marriage in
particular have changed and are still evolving, "the asserted contemporary
concept of marriage and societal interests for which [plaintiffs] contend" are
"manifestly [less] deeply founded" [***133] than the "historic institution" of
marriage. Matter of the Estate of Cooper, 187 A.D.2d 128, 133-134, 592 N.Y.S.2d
797 (N.Y. 1993). Indeed, it is not readily apparent to what extent contemporary
values have embraced the concept of same-sex marriage. Perhaps the "clearest and
most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation
enacted by the country's legislatures," Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312,
153 L. Ed. 2d 335, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002), quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 331, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). No State Legislature has
enacted laws permitting same-sex marriages; and a large majority of States, as
well as the United States Congress, have affirmatively prohibited the
recognition of such marriages for any purpose. See P. Greenberg, State Laws
Affecting Lesbians and Gays, National Conference of State Legislatures
Legisbriefs at 1 (April/May 2001) (reporting that, as of May, 2001, thirty-six
States had enacted "defense of marriage" statutes); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) (Federal Defense of Marriage Act).
Given this [***134] history and the current state of public opinion, as
reflected in the actions of the people's elected representatives, it cannot be
said that "a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and
collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate
the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions. Neither . . . [is] a right to same-sex
marriage [*375] . . . implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed." Baehr v. Lewin,
74 Haw. 530, 556-557, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). See Dean v. District of Columbia, 653
A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995) [**991] (per curiam) (Ferren, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 312, 191 N.W.2d 185
(1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810, 34 L. Ed. 2d 65, 93 S. Ct. 37 (1972);
Storrs v. Holcomb, 168 Misc. 2d 898, 899-900, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1996), dismissed, 245 A.D.2d 943, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (N.Y. 1997) [***135] . n11
In such circumstances, the law with respect to same-sex marriages must be left
to develop through legislative processes, subject to the constraints of
rationality, lest the court be viewed as using the liberty and due process
clauses as vehicles merely to enforce its own views regarding better social
policies, a role that the strongly worded separation of powers principles in
art. 30 of the Declaration of Rights of our Constitution forbids, and for which
the court is particularly ill suited.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n11 Because of the absence of deep historical roots, every court but one that
has considered recognizing a fundamental right to same-sex marriage, has
declined to do so. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 333 (D.C. 1995) (per
curiam) (Ferren, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Baehr v. Lewin,
74 Haw. 530, 556-557, 852 P.2d 44 (1993); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310,
312-314, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971); Storrs v. Holcomb, 168 Misc. 2d 898, 899-900,
645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), dismissed, 245 A.D.2d 943, 666 N.Y.S.2d
835 (N.Y. 1997). The one exception was the Alaska Superior Court, which relied
on that State's Constitution's express and broadly construed right to privacy.
Brause vs. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562CJ (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb.
27, 1998).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***136]
B. The marriage statute, in limiting marriage to heterosexual couples, does not
constitute discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of the Equal Rights
Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution. In his concurrence, Justice Greaney
contends that the marriage statute constitutes discrimination on the basis of
sex in violation of art. 1 of the Declaration of Rights as amended by art. 106
of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth, the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA). n12 Such a conclusion is analytically unsound and inconsistent
with the legislative history of the ERA.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n12 Article 106 is referred to as the Equal Rights Amendment.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The central purpose of the ERA was to eradicate discrimination against women and
in favor of men or vice versa. See [*376] Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342, 357, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979).
Consistent with this purpose, we have construed the ERA to prohibit laws that
advantage one sex at the expense of the [***137] other, but not laws that treat
men and women equally, id. at 346-349 (assuming that "separate but equal"
treatment of males and females would be constitutionally permissible). The
Massachusetts marriage statute does not subject men to different treatment from
women; each is equally prohibited from precisely the same conduct. See Baker v.
State, 170 Vt. 194, 215 n.13, 744 A.2d 864 (1999) ("there is no discrete class
subject to differential treatment solely on the basis of sex"). Compare
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 16, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977) (law prohibiting
prostitution applied to both male and female prostitutes and therefore did not
discriminate), and Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274-275, 60
L. Ed. 2d 870, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979) (declining to characterize veterans'
preference as sex discrimination because it applied to both [**992] male and
female veterans), with Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, supra, and Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980)
(where statutes and rules at issue advantaged one sex over another).
Of [***138] course, a statute that on its face treats protected groups equally
may still harm, stigmatize, or advantage one over the other. Such was the
circumstance in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87 S. Ct.
1817 (1967), where the Supreme Court struck down a State statute that made
interracial marriage a crime, as constituting invidious discrimination on the
basis of race. While the statute purported to apply equally to whites and
nonwhites, the Court found that it was intended and structured to favor one race
(white) and disfavor all others (nonwhites). The statute's legislative history
demonstrated that its purpose was not merely to punish interracial marriage, but
to do so for the sole benefit of the white race. As the Supreme Court readily
concluded, the Virginia law was "designed to maintain White Supremacy." Id. at
11. Consequently, there was a fit between the class that the law was intended to
discriminate against (nonwhite races) and the classification enjoying heightened
protection (race).
By contrast, here there is no evidence that limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples was motivated by sexism in general or a desire to disadvantage [***139]
men or women in particular. Moreover, no one has identified any harm, burden,
disadvantage, or [*377] advantage accruing to either gender as a consequence
of the Massachusetts marriage statute. In the absence of such effect, the
statute limiting marriage to couples of the opposite sex does not violate the
ERA's prohibition of sex discrimination. n13
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n13 Justice Greaney views Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010, 87
S. Ct. 1817 (1967), as standing analogously for the proposition that just as a
person cannot be barred from marrying another person because of his or her race,
a person cannot be barred from marrying another person because of his or her
sex. Ante at (Greaney, J., concurring). While superficially attractive, this
analogy does not withstand closer scrutiny. Unlike Virginia's antimiscegenation
statute, neither the purpose nor effect of the Massachusetts marriage statute is
to advantage or disadvantage one gender over the other. This distinction is
critical and was central to the Loving decision. More fundamentally, the statute
at issue burdened marriage with a requirement that was both constitutionally
suspect and unrelated to protecting either the underlying purposes or nature of
the institution. In contrast, the limitation of marriage to one man and one
woman preserves both its structure and its historic purposes.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***140]
This conclusion is buttressed by the legislative history of the ERA, which was
adopted by the voters on November 2, 1976, after being approved by
constitutional conventions of the Legislature on August 15, 1973, (by a vote of
261-0) and May 14, 1975 (by a vote of 217-55).
In anticipation of its adoption, the Legislature enacted and, on June 21, 1975,
the Governor approved a "Resolve providing for an investigation and study by a
special commission relative to the effect of the ratification of the proposed
amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the
Constitution of the United States prohibiting discrimination on account of sex
upon the laws, business communities and public in the Commonwealth." Res. 1975,
c. 26. One of the principal tasks of the commission was to catalog the aspects
of the General Laws that would have to be amended for the statutory code to
comply with the mandate of the proposed amendment that equality not be abridged
on the basis of sex. n14
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n14 The commission was composed of five State representatives, three State
senators and three gubernatorial appointees. All of the gubernatorial appointees
were attorneys.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***141]
[**993] On October 19, 1976, just before the general election at which the
amendment was to be considered, the commission filed its Interim Report, which
focused on the effect of the Massachusetts ERA on the laws of the Commonwealth.
1976 Senate Doc. No. 1689. A section of the report, entitled "Areas Unaffected
by the [*378] Equal Rights Amendment," addressed some of the legal regimes that
would not be affected by the adoption of the ERA. One such area was "Homosexual
Marriage," about which the commission stated:
"An equal rights amendment will have no effect upon the allowance or denial of
homosexual marriages. The equal rights amendment is not concerned with the
relationship of two persons of the same sex; it only addresses those laws or
public-related actions which treat persons of opposite sexes differently. The
Washington Court of Appeals has already stated that the equal rights amendment
to its state constitution did not afford a basis for validating homosexual
marriages. In Colorado, the attorney general has likewise issued an opinion that
the state equal rights amendment did not validate homosexual marriage. There are
no cases which have used a state equal rights amendment to either [***142]
validate or require the allowance of homosexual marriages." (Footnotes omitted.)
Id. at 21-22. n15
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n15 The Washington case cited by the commission was Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn. App.
247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The views of the commission were reflected in the public debate surrounding the
passage of the ERA that focused on gender equality. See, e.g., Referenda
reviewed, Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1976, at 26; Voters' guide on nine state
referendum measures, Boston Herald American, Nov. 1, 1976, at 17. Claims that
the ERA might be the basis for validating marriages between same-sex couples
were labelled as "exaggerated" and "unfounded." For example, before the vote,
the Boston Globe published an editorial discussing and urging favorable action
on the ERA. In making its case, it noted that "those urging a no vote . . .
argue that the amendment would . . . legitimize marriage between people of the
same sex [and other changes]. In reality, the proposed amendment would require
none of [***143] these things. Mass. ballot issues . . . 1 Equal Rights
Amendment. Boston Globe, Nov. 1, 1976, at 29. And in the aftermath of the vote,
the Boston Globe heralded the electorate's acceptance of "the arguments of
proponents that the proposal would not result [*379] in many far-reaching or
threatening changes." Referendums fared poorly, Boston Globe, Nov. 4, 1976, at
29.
While the court, in interpreting a constitutional amendment, is not bound to
accept either the views of a legislative commission studying and reporting on
the amendment's likely effects, or of public commentary and debate
contemporaneous with its passage, it ought to be wary of completely disregarding
what appears to be the clear intent of the people recently recorded in our
constitutional history. This is particularly so where the plain wording of the
amendment does not require the result it would reach.
C. The marriage statute satisfies the rational basis standard. The burden of
demonstrating that a statute does not satisfy the rational basis standard rests
on the plaintiffs. It is a weighty one. "[A] [**994] reviewing court will
presume a statute's validity, and make all rational inferences in favor of it. .
. . The Legislature [***144] is not required to justify its classifications,
nor provide a record or finding in support of them." (Citation omitted.) Paro v.
Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 650, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977). The statute "only
need[s to] be supported by a conceivable rational basis." Fine v. Contributory
Retirement Appeal Bd., 401 Mass. 639, 641, 518 N.E.2d 1151 (1988). See
Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 771-772, 767
N.E.2d 549 (2002). As this court stated in Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass.
682, 687-688, 421 N.E.2d 1181 (1981):
"It is not the court's function to launch an inquiry to resolve a debate which
has already been settled in the legislative forum. 'It [is] the judge's duty . .
. to give effect to the will of the people as expressed in the statute by their
representative body. It is in this way . . . that the doctrine of separation of
powers is given meaning.' Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 202, 243 N.E.2d
898 (1969) (Kirk, J., concurring).
"This respect for the legislative process means that it is not the province of
the court to sit and weigh conflicting evidence supporting or [***145] opposing
a legislative enactment. . . .
"Although persons challenging the constitutionality of legislation may introduce
evidence in support of their [*380] claim that the legislation is irrational .
. . they will not prevail if 'the question is at least debatable' in view of the
evidence which may have been available to the Legislature. United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154, 82 L. Ed. 1234, 58 S. Ct. 778 (1938)."
The "time tested wisdom of the separation of powers" requires courts to avoid
"judicial legislation in the guise of new constructions to meet real or supposed
new popular viewpoints, preserving always to the Legislature alone its proper
prerogative of adjusting the statutes to changed conditions." Pielech v.
Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 423 Mass. 534, 539, 540, 668 N.E.2d 1298 (1996),
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1131, 137 L. Ed. 2d 356, 117 S. Ct. 1280 (1997), quoting
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 368 Mass. 580, 595, 334 N.E.2d 617 (1975).
In analyzing whether a statute satisfies the rational basis standard, we look to
the nature of the classification embodied in the enactment, then to whether the
statute [***146] serves a legitimate State purpose, and finally to whether the
classification is reasonably related to the furtherance of that purpose. With
this framework, we turn to the challenged statute, G. L. c. 207, which
authorizes local town officials to issue licenses to couples of the opposite sex
authorizing them to enter the institution of civil marriage.
1. Classification. The nature of the classification at issue is readily
apparent. Opposite-sex couples can obtain a license and same-sex couples cannot.
The granting of this license, and the completion of the required solemnization
of the marriage, opens the door to many statutory benefits and imposes numerous
responsibilities. The fact that the statute does not permit such licenses to be
issued to couples of the same sex thus bars them from civil marriage. The
classification is not drawn between men and women or between heterosexuals and
homosexuals, any of whom can obtain a license to marry a member of the opposite
sex; rather, it is drawn between same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples.
2. State purpose. The court's opinion concedes that the civil marriage statute
serves legitimate State purposes, but further [**995] investigation [***147]
and elaboration of those purposes is both helpful and necessary.
[*381] Civil marriage is the institutional mechanism by which societies have
sanctioned and recognized particular family structures, and the institution of
marriage has existed as one of the fundamental organizing principles of human
society. See C.N. Degler, The Emergence of the Modern American Family, in The
American Family in Social-Historical Perspective 61 (3d ed. 1983); A.J. Hawkins,
Introduction, in Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the Twenty-First
Century: An Agenda for Strengthening Marriage xiv (2002); C. Lasch, Social
Pathologists and the Socialization of Reproduction, in The American Family in
Social-Historical Perspective, supra at 80; W.J. O'Donnell & D.A. Jones,
Marriage and Marital Alternatives 1 (1982); L. Saxton, The Individual, Marriage,
and the Family 229-230, 260 (1968); M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, Marriages and
Families: Diversity and Change 4 (1994); Wardle, "Multiply and Replenish":
Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital
Procreation, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 771, 777-780 (2001); J.Q. Wilson, The
Marriage Problem: How Our Culture Has Weakened [***148] Families 28, 40, 66-67
(2002). Marriage has not been merely a contractual arrangement for legally
defining the private relationship between two individuals (although that is
certainly part of any marriage). Rather, on an institutional level, marriage is
the "very basis of the whole fabric of civilized society," J.P. Bishop,
Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, and Evidence in Matrimonial
Suits § 32 (1852), and it serves many important political, economic, social,
educational, procreational, and personal functions.
Paramount among its many important functions, the institution of marriage has
systematically provided for the regulation of heterosexual behavior, brought
order to the resulting procreation, and ensured a stable family structure in
which children will be reared, educated, and socialized. See Milford v.
Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 52 (1810) (civil marriage "intended to regulate, chasten,
and refine, the intercourse between the sexes; and to multiply, preserve, and
improve the species"). See also P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, American Couples:
Money, Work, Sex 29 (1983); C.N. Degler, supra at 61; G. Douglas, Marriage,
Cohabitation, and Parenthood [***149] -- From Contract to Status?, in Cross
Currents: Family Law and Policy in the United States and [*382] England 223
(2000); S.L. Nock, The Social Costs of De-Institutionalizing Marriage, in
Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the Twenty-First Century: An Agenda
for Strengthening Marriage, supra at 7; L. Saxton, supra at 239- 240, 242; M.A.
Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at 4-6; Wardle, supra at 781-796; J.Q. Wilson,
supra at 23-32. Admittedly, heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child
care are not necessarily conjoined (particularly in the modern age of widespread
effective contraception and supportive social welfare programs), but an orderly
society requires some mechanism for coping with the fact that sexual intercourse
commonly results in pregnancy and childbirth. The institution of marriage is
that mechanism.
The institution of marriage provides the important legal and normative link
between heterosexual intercourse and procreation on the one hand and family
responsibilities on the other. The partners in a marriage are expected to engage
in exclusive sexual relations, with children the probable result and paternity
presumed. See G. L. c. 209C, § 6 [***150] ("a man is presumed to be the father
of a child . . . if he is or has been married to the mother and the child was
born during the marriage, or within three hundred days after [**996] the
marriage was terminated by death, annulment or divorce"). Whereas the
relationship between mother and child is demonstratively and predictably created
and recognizable through the biological process of pregnancy and childbirth,
there is no corresponding process for creating a relationship between father and
child. n16 Similarly, aside from an act of heterosexual intercourse nine months
prior to childbirth, there is no process for creating a relationship between a
man and a woman as the parents of a particular child. The institution of
marriage fills this void by formally binding the husband-father to his wife and
child, and imposing on him the responsibilities of fatherhood. See J.Q. Wilson,
supra at 23-32. See also P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, supra at 29; C.N. Degler,
supra at 61; G. Douglas, supra at 223; S.L. Nock, supra at 7; L. Saxton, supra
at 239-240, 242; M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at 4-6; Wardle, supra at
781-796. The alternative, a [*383] society without the institution [***151]
of marriage, in which heterosexual intercourse, procreation, and child care are
largely disconnected processes, would be chaotic.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n16 Modern DNA testing may reveal actual paternity, but it establishes only a
genetic relationship between father and child.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The marital family is also the foremost setting for the education and
socialization of children. Children learn about the world and their place in it
primarily from those who raise them, and those children eventually grow up to
exert some influence, great or small, positive or negative, on society. The
institution of marriage encourages parents to remain committed to each other and
to their children as they grow, thereby encouraging a stable venue for the
education and socialization of children. See P. Blumstein & P. Schwartz, supra
at 26; C.N. Degler, supra at 61; S.L. Nock, supra at 2-3; C. Lasch, supra at 81;
M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at 6-7. More macroscopically, construction of
a family through marriage also formalizes the [***152] bonds between people in
an ordered and institutional manner, thereby facilitating a foundation of
interconnectedness and interdependency on which more intricate stabilizing
social structures might be built. See M. Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law
and Family in Nineteenth-Century America 10 (1985); C. Lasch, supra; L. Saxton,
supra at 260; J.Q. Wilson, supra at 221.
This court, among others, has consistently acknowledged both the institutional
importance of marriage as an organizing principle of society, and the State's
interest in regulating it. See French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546, 195 N.E.
714 (1935) ("Marriage is not merely a contract between the parties. It is the
foundation of the family. It is a social institution of the highest importance.
The Commonwealth has a deep interest that its integrity is not jeopardized");
Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 52 (1810) ("Marriage, being essential to the
peace and harmony, and to the virtues and improvements of civil society, it has
been, in all well-regulated governments, among the first attentions of the civil
magistrate to regulate [it]"). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541,
86 L. Ed. 1655, 62 S. Ct. 1110 (1942) [***153] ("Marriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the [human] race"); Maynard v.
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211, 31 L. Ed. 654, 8 S. Ct. 723 (1888) (marriage "is an
institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested, for it is the foundation of the family [*384] and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress"); Murphy v.
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45, [**997] 29 L. Ed. 47, 5 S. Ct. 747 (1885) ("no
legislation can be supposed more wholesome and necessary in the founding of a
free, self-governing commonwealth . . . than that which seeks to establish it on
the basis of the idea of the family, as consisting in and springing from the
union for life of one man and one woman . . . the sure foundation of all that is
stable and noble in our civilization; the best guaranty of that reverent
morality which is the source of all beneficent progress in social and political
improvement"); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165, 25 L. Ed. 244 (1878)
("Upon [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring
social relations and social obligations and [***154] duties, with which
government is necessarily required to deal").
It is undeniably true that dramatic historical shifts in our cultural,
political, and economic landscape have altered some of our traditional notions
about marriage, including the interpersonal dynamics within it, n17 the range of
responsibilities required of it as an institution, n18 and the legal environment
in which it exists. n19 Nevertheless, the institution of marriage remains the
principal weave of our social fabric. See C.N. Degler, supra at 61; A.J.
Hawkins, Introduction, in Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the
Twenty-First Century: An Agenda for Strengthening Marriage xiv (2002); C. Lasch,
supra at 80; W.J. O'Donnell & D.A. Jones, Marriage and Marital Alternatives 1
(1982); L. Saxton, supra at 229-230, 260; M.A. Schwartz & B.M. Scott, supra at
4; Wardle, supra at 777-780; J.Q. Wilson, supra at 28, 40, 66-67. A family
defined by heterosexual marriage continues to be the most prevalent social
structure into which the vast majority of children are born, nurtured, and
prepared for productive participation in civil society, see Children's Living
Arrangements and Characteristics: [***155] March, [*385] 2002, United States
Census Bureau Current Population Reports at 3 (June, 2003) (in 2002, 69% of
children lived with two married parents, 23% lived with their mother, 5% lived
with their father, and 4% lived in households with neither parent present).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n17 The normative relationship between husband and wife has changed markedly due
to the overwhelming movement toward gender equality both at home and in the
marketplace.n18 The availability of a variety of social welfare programs and
public education has in many instances affected the status of the marital family
as the only environment dedicated to the care, protection, and education of
children.n19 No-fault divorce has made the dissolution of marriage much easier
than ever before.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
It is difficult to imagine a State purpose more important and legitimate than
ensuring, promoting, and supporting an optimal social structure within which to
bear and raise children. At the very least, the marriage statute continues to
serve this important [***156] State purpose. n20
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n20 "It is important to distinguish the individual interests in domestic
relations from the social interest in the family and marriage as social
institutions." Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 Mich.
L. Rev. 177, 177 (1916). The court's opinion blurs this important distinction
and emphasizes the personal and emotional dimensions that often accompany
marriage. It is, however, only society's interest in the institution of marriage
as a stabilizing social structure that justifies the statutory benefits and
burdens that attend to the status provided by its laws. Personal fulfilment and
public celebrations or announcements of commitment have little if anything to do
with the purpose of the civil marriage laws, or with a legitimate public
interest that would justify them.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. Rational relationship. The question we must turn to next is whether the
statute, construed as limiting marriage to couples of the opposite sex, remains
a rational [**998] way to further that [***157] purpose. Stated differently,
we ask whether a conceivable rational basis exists on which the Legislature
could conclude that continuing to limit the institution of civil marriage to
members of the opposite sex furthers the legitimate purpose of ensuring,
promoting, and supporting an optimal social structure for the bearing and
raising of children. n21
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n21 In support of its conclusion that the marriage statute does not satisfy the
rational basis test, the court emphasizes that "the department has offered no
evidence that forbidding marriage to people of the same sex will increase the
number of couples choosing to enter into opposite-sex marriages in order to have
and raise children." Ante at . This surprising statement misallocates the burden
of proof in a constitutional challenge to the rational basis of a statute (see
supra at - ). It is the plaintiffs who must prove that supporting and promoting
one form of relationship by providing (as is pointed out) literally hundreds of
benefits, could not conceivably affect the decision-making of anyone considering
whether to bear and raise a child. The department is not required to present
"evidence" of anything.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***158]
In considering whether such a rational basis exists, we defer to the
decision-making process of the Legislature, and must make deferential
assumptions about the information that it might [*386] consider and on which
it may rely. See Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 688, 421 N.E.2d 1181
(1981) (court considers "evidence which may have been available to the
Legislature" [emphasis added]); Slome v. Chief of Police of Fitchburg, 304 Mass.
187, 189, 23 N.E.2d 133 (1939) ("any rational basis of fact that can be
reasonably conceived" may support legislative finding); Mutual Loan Co. v.
Martell, 200 Mass. 482, 487, 86 N.E. 916 (1909), aff'd, 222 U.S. 225, 56 L. Ed.
175, 32 S. Ct. 74 (1911) ("Legislature may be supposed to have known" relevant
facts).
We must assume that the Legislature (1) might conclude that the institution of
civil marriage has successfully and continually provided this structure over
several centuries n22; (2) might consider and credit studies that document
negative consequences that too often follow children either born outside of
marriage or raised in households lacking either a father or a mother figure, n23
and scholarly commentary [***159] [**999] contending that children and
families [*387] develop best when mothers and fathers are partners in their
parenting n24; and (3) would be familiar with many recent studies that variously
support the proposition that children raised in intact families headed by
same-sex couples fare as well on many measures as children raised in similar
families headed by opposite-sex couples n25; support the proposition that
children of same-sex couples fare worse on some measures n26; or reveal notable
differences between the two groups of children that warrant further study. n27
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n22 See C.N. Degler, The Emergence of the Modern American Family, in The
American Family in Social-Historical Perspective 61 (3d ed. 1983); A.J. Hawkins,
Introduction, in Revitalizing the Institution of Marriage for the Twenty-First
Century: An Agenda for Strengthening Marriage xiv (2002); C. Lasch, Social
Pathologists and the Socialization of Reproduction, in The American Family in
Social-Historical Perspective, 80 (3d ed. 1983); W.J. O'Donnell & D.A. Jones,
The Law of Marriage and Marital Alternatives 1 (1982); L. Saxton, The
Individual, Marriage and the Family 229-230, 260 (1968); M.A. Schwartz & B.M.
Scott, Marriages and Families: Diversity and Change 4 (1994); Wardle, "Multiply
and Replenish": Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in
Marital Procreation, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 771, 777-780 (2001); J.Q.
Wilson, The Marriage Problem: How Our Culture has Weakened Families 28, 40,
66-67 (2002). [***160]
n23 See Rodney, Behavioral Differences between African American Male
Adolescents with Biological Fathers and Those Without Biological Fathers in the
Home, 30 J. Black Stud. 45, 53 (1999) (African-American juveniles who lived with
their biological fathers displayed fewer behavioral problems than those whose
biological fathers were absent from home); Chilton, Family Disruption,
Delinquent Conduct and the Effect of Subclassification, 37 Am. Soc. Rev. 93, 95
(1972) (proportion of youth charged with juvenile offenses who were not living
in husband-wife family was larger than comparable proportion of youth charged
with juvenile offenses who were living in husband-wife family); Hoffmann, A
National Portrait of Family Structure and Adolescent Drug Use, 60 J. Marriage &
Fam. 633 (1998) (children from households with both mother and father reported
relatively low use of drugs, whereas children from households without their
natural mothers and from other family type households had highest prevalence of
drug use). See also D. Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most
Urgent Social Problem 25 (1995).n24 H.B. Biller & J.L. Kimpton, The Father and
the School- Aged Child, in The Role of The Father in Child Development 143 (3d
ed. 1997); H.B. Biller, Fathers and Families: Paternal Factors in Child
Development 1-3 (1993); Lynne Marie Kohm, The Homosexual "Union": Should Gay and
Lesbian Partnerships be Granted the Same Status as Marriage? 22 J. Contemp. L.
51, 61 & nn.53, 54 (1996) ("statistics continue to show that the most stable
family for children to grow up in is that consisting of a father and a mother").
[***161]
n25 See, e.g., Patterson, Family Relationships of Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 J.
Marriage & Fam. 1052, 1060, 1064-1065 (2000) (concluding that there are no
significant differences between children of same-sex parents and children of
heterosexual parents in aspects of personal development).n26 See, e.g., Cameron,
Homosexual Parents, 31 Adolescence 757, 770-774 (1996) (concluding results of
limited study consonant with notion that children raised by homosexuals
disproportionately experience emotional disturbance and sexual victimization).
n27 See, e.g., Stacey, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66
Amer. Soc. Rev. 159, 172, 176-179 (2001) (finding significant statistical
differences in parenting practices, gender roles, sexual behavior but noting
that "heterosexism" and political implications have constrained research). See
also Coleman, Reinvestigating Remarriage: Another Decade of Progress, 62 J.
Marriage & Fam. 1288 (2000) (concluding that future studies of impact of divorce
and remarriage on children should focus on "nontraditional" stepfamilies,
particularly same-sex couples with children, because impact of such arrangements
have been overlooked in other studies).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***162]
We must also assume that the Legislature would be aware of the critiques of the
methodologies used in virtually all of the comparative studies of children
raised in these different environments, cautioning that the sampling populations
are not representative, that the observation periods are too limited in time,
n28 that the empirical data are unreliable, and that the [*388] hypotheses are
too infused with political or agenda driven bias. See, e.g., R. Lerner & A.K.
Nagai, No Basis: What the Studies Don't Tell Us About Same-Sex Parenting,
Marriage Law Project (Jan. 2001) (criticizing forty-nine studies on same-sex
parenting -- at least twenty-six of which were cited by amici in this case -- as
suffering from flaws in formulation of hypotheses, use of experimental controls,
use of measurements, sampling and statistical testing, and finding false
negatives); Stacey, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter, 66 Am.
Soc. Rev. 159, 159-166 (2001) (highlighting problems with sampling pools, lack
of longitudinal studies, and political hypotheses).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n28 In Massachusetts, for example, the State's adoption laws were only recently
interpreted to permit adoption by same-sex partners. Adoption of Tammy, 416
Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993). It is fair to assume that most of the children
affected by that ruling, who properly would be the subject of study in their
teenage and adult years, are still only children today.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***163]
Taking all of this available information into account, the Legislature could
rationally conclude that a family environment with married opposite-sex parents
remains [**1000] the optimal social structure in which to bear children, and
that the raising of children by same-sex couples, who by definition cannot be
the two sole biological parents of a child and cannot provide children with a
parental authority figure of each gender, n29 presents an alternative structure
for child rearing that has not yet proved itself beyond reasonable scientific
dispute to be as optimal as the biologically based marriage norm. See Baker v.
State, 170 Vt. 194, 222, 744 A.2d 864 (1999) ("conceivable that the Legislature
could conclude that opposite-sex partners offer advantages in the area [of child
rearing], although . . . experts disagree and the answer is decidedly uncertain
"). Cf. Marcoux v. Attorney Gen., 375 Mass. 63, 65, 375 N.E.2d 688 (1978).
Working from the assumption that a recognition of same-sex marriages will
increase the number of children experiencing this alternative, the Legislature
[*389] could conceivably conclude that declining to recognize same-sex
marriages remains [***164] prudent until empirical questions about its impact
on the upbringing of children are resolved. n30
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n29 This family structure raises the prospect of children lacking any parent of
their own gender. For example, a boy raised by two lesbians as his parents has
no male parent. Contrary to the suggestion that concerns about such a family
arrangement is based on "stereotypical" views about the differences between
sexes, ante at n.28, concern about such an arrangement remains rational. It is,
for example, rational to posit that the child himself might invoke gender as a
justification for the view that neither of his parents "understands" him, or
that they "don't know what he is going through," particularly if his
disagreement or dissatisfaction involves some issue pertaining to sex. Given
that same-sex couples raising children are a very recent phenomenon, the
ramifications of an adolescent child's having two parents but not one of his or
her own gender have yet to be fully realized and cannot yet even be tested in
significant numbers. But see note 25, supra, regarding studies of children
raised without parents of each gender. [***165]
n30 The same could be true of any other potentially promising but recent
innovation in the relationships of persons raising children.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The fact that the Commonwealth currently allows same-sex couples to adopt, see
Adoption of Tammy, 416 Mass. 205, 619 N.E.2d 315 (1993), does not affect the
rationality of this conclusion. The eligibility of a child for adoption
presupposes that at least one of the child's biological parents is unable or
unwilling, for some reason, to participate in raising the child. In that sense,
society has "lost" the optimal setting in which to raise that child -- it is
simply not available. In these circumstances, the principal and overriding
consideration is the "best interests of the child," considering his or her
unique circumstances and the options that are available for that child. The
objective is an individualized determination of the best environment for a
particular child, where the normative social structure -- a home with both the
child's biological father and mother -- is not an option. That such a focused
determination may lead to the approval [***166] of a same-sex couple's adoption
of a child does not mean that it would be irrational for a legislator, in
fashioning statutory laws that cannot make such individualized determinations,
to conclude generally that being raised by a same-sex couple has not yet been
shown to be the absolute equivalent of being raised by one's married biological
parents.
That the State does not preclude different types of families from raising
children does not mean that it must view them all as equally optimal and equally
deserving of State endorsement and support. n31 For example, [**1001] single
persons are allowed to adopt children, but the fact that the Legislature permits
single-parent [*390] adoption does not mean that it has endorsed single
parenthood as an optimal setting in which to raise children or views it as the
equivalent of being raised by both of one's biological parents. n32 The same
holds true with respect to same-sex couples -- the fact that they may adopt
children means only that the Legislature has concluded that they may provide an
acceptable setting in which to raise children who cannot be raised by both of
their biological parents. The Legislature may rationally permit adoption by
same-sex couples [***167] yet harbor reservations as to whether parenthood by
same-sex couples should be affirmatively encouraged to the same extent as
parenthood by the heterosexual couple whose union produced the child. n33
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n31 The plaintiffs also argue that because the State requires insurance
companies to provide coverage for diagnosing and treating infertility
unrestricted to those who are married, G. L. c. 175, § 47H, limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples is contrary to its currently stated public policy, and,
therefore no longer rational. This argument is not persuasive. The fact that the
Legislature has seen fit to require that health insurers cover the medical
condition of infertility, for all subscribers, is not inconsistent with the
State's policy of encouraging and endorsing heterosexual marriage as the optimum
structure in which to bear and raise children. There is no rule that requires
the State to limit every law bearing on birth and child rearing to the confines
of heterosexual marriage in order to vindicate its policy of supporting that
structure as optimal. Just as the insurance laws relating to infertility
coverage cannot be said to be a State endorsement of childbirth out of wedlock,
they cannot be said to represent an abandonment of the State's policy regarding
a preference that children be born into and raised in the context of
heterosexual marriage. [***168]
n32 Indeed, just recently, this court reasoned that the Legislature could
permissibly conclude that children being raised by single parents "may be at
heightened risk for certain kinds of harm when compared with children of
so-called intact families," because such children "may not have or be able to
draw on the resources of two parents" when having to cope with some form of
loss. Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 663, 664, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 1189, 154 L. Ed. 2d 1022, 123 S. Ct. 1259 (2003). In that case,
the differences between single parents and parents raising a child together
sufficed to justify subjecting single parents to the grandparent visitation
statute, G. L. c. 119, § 39D. Id. at 662-664. Because the statute implicated
fundamental parental rights, its classifications had to survive strict scrutiny,
id. at 660, not the mere rational basis test at issue in today's opinion. The
fact that single people can adopt children did not insulate them from
differential treatment with respect to their parental rights.n33 Similarly,
while the fact that our laws have evolved to include a strong affirmative policy
against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, have decriminalized
intimate adult conduct, and have abolished the legal distinctions between
marital and nonmarital children, may well be a reason to celebrate a more open
and humane society, they ought not be the basis on which to conclude that there
is no longer a rational basis for the current marriage law. See ante at . To
conclude the latter based on the former threatens the process of social reform
in a democratic society. States must be free to experiment in the realm of
social and civil relations, incrementally and without concern that a step or two
in one direction will determine the outcome of the experiment as a matter of
law. If they are not, those who argue "slippery slope" will have more ammunition
than ever to resist any effort at progressive change or social experimentation,
and will be able to put the lie to the arguments of the proponents of such
efforts, that an incremental step forward does not preordain a result which
neither the people nor their elected representatives may yet be prepared to
accept.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***169]
In addition, the Legislature could conclude that redefining the [*391]
institution of marriage to permit same-sex couples to marry would impair the
State's interest in promoting and supporting heterosexual marriage as the social
institution that it has determined best normalizes, stabilizes, and links the
acts of procreation and child [**1002] rearing. While the plaintiffs argue
that they only want to take part in the same stabilizing institution, the
Legislature conceivably could conclude that permitting their participation would
have the unintended effect of undermining to some degree marriage's ability to
serve its social purpose. See Commonwealth v. Stowell, 389 Mass. 171, 175, 449
N.E.2d 357 (1983) (given State's broad concern with institution of marriage, it
has "legitimate interest in prohibiting conduct which may threaten that
institution").
As long as marriage is limited to opposite-sex couples who can at least
theoretically procreate, society is able to communicate a consistent message to
its citizens that marriage is a (normatively) necessary part of their
procreative endeavor; that if they are to procreate, then society has endorsed
the institution of marriage as the [***170] environment for it and for the
subsequent rearing of their children; and that benefits are available explicitly
to create a supportive and conducive atmosphere for those purposes. If society
proceeds similarly to recognize marriages between same-sex couples who cannot
procreate, it could be perceived as an abandonment of this claim, and might
result in the mistaken view that civil marriage has little to do with
procreation: just as the potential of procreation would not be necessary for a
marriage to be valid, marriage would not be necessary for optimal procreation
and child rearing to occur. n34 In essence, the Legislature could conclude that
the consequence [*392] of such a policy shift would be a diminution in society
's ability to steer the acts of procreation and child rearing into their most
optimal setting. n35 Hall-Omar Baking Co. [**1003] v. Commissioner of Labor &
Indus., 344 Mass. 695, 700, 184 N.E.2d 344 (1962) ("Legislative classification
is valid if it is rational and bears some relationship to the object intended to
be accomplished" [emphasis added]).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n34 The court contends that the exclusive and permanent commitment of the
marriage partnership rather than the begetting of children is the sine qua non
of civil marriage, ante at, and that "the 'marriage is procreation' argument
singles out the one unbridgeable difference between same-sex and opposite-sex
couples, and transforms that difference into the essence of legal marriage."
Ante at . The court has it backward. Civil marriage is the product of society's
critical need to manage procreation as the inevitable consequence of intercourse
between members of the opposite sex. Procreation has always been at the root of
marriage and the reasons for its existence as a social institution. Its
structure, one man and one woman committed for life, reflects society's judgment
as how optimally to manage procreation and the resultant child rearing. The
court, in attempting to divorce procreation from marriage, transforms the form
of the structure into its purpose. In doing so, it turns history on its head.
The court compounds its error by likening the marriage statute to Colorado's
"Amendment 2" which was struck by the United States Supreme Court in Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633, 134 L. Ed. 2d 855, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). That
amendment repealed all Colorado laws and ordinances that barred discrimination
against homosexuals, and prohibited any governmental entity from adopting
similar statutes. The amendment withdrew from homosexuals, but no others, legal
protection from a broad range of injuries caused by private and governmental
discrimination, "imposing a broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group." Id. at 632. As the Court noted, its sheer breadth seems
"inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects." Id. The
comparison to the Massachusetts marriage statute, which limits the institution
of marriage (created to manage procreation) to opposite-sex couples who can
theoretically procreate, is completely inapposite. [***171]
n35 Although the marriage statute is overinclusive because it comprehends
within its scope infertile or voluntarily nonreproductive opposite-sex couples,
this overinclusiveness does not make the statute constitutionally infirm. See
Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 778, 767
N.E.2d 549 (2002) ("Some degree of overinclusiveness or underinclusiveness is
constitutionally permissible . . ."). The overinclusiveness present here is
constitutionally permissible because the Commonwealth has chosen, reasonably,
not to test every prospective married couple for fertility and not to demand of
fertile prospective married couples whether or not they will procreate. It is
satisfied, rather, to allow every couple whose biological opposition makes
procreation theoretically possible to join the institution.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The court recognizes this concern, but brushes it aside with the assumption that
permitting same-sex couples to marry "will not diminish the validity or dignity
of opposite-sex marriage," ante at, and that "we have no doubt that marriage
will continue [***172] to be a vibrant and revered institution." Ante at .
Whether the court is correct in its assumption is irrelevant. What is relevant
is that such predicting is not the business of the courts. A rational
Legislature, given the evidence, could conceivably come to a different
conclusion, or could at least [*393] harbor rational concerns about possible
unintended consequences of a dramatic redefinition of marriage. n36
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n36 Concerns about such unintended consequences cannot be dismissed as fanciful
or far-fetched. Legislative actions taken in the 1950's and 1960's in areas as
widely arrayed as domestic relations law and welfare legislation have had
significant unintended adverse consequences in subsequent decades including the
dramatic increase in children born out of wedlock, and the destabilization of
the institution of marriage. See Nonmarital Childbearing in the United States
1940-99, National Center for Health Statistics, 48 Nat'l Vital Stat. Reps. at 2
(Oct. 2000) (nonmarital childbirths increased from 3.8% of annual births in 1940
to 33% in 1999); M.D. Bramlett, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage
in the United States, National Center for Health Statistics, Vital & Health
Stat. at 4-5 (July 2002) (due to higher divorce rates and postponement of
marriage, proportion of people's lives spent in marriage declined significantly
during later half of Twentieth Century).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***173]
There is no question that many same-sex couples are capable of being good
parents, and should be (and are) permitted to be so. The policy question that a
legislator must resolve is a different one, and turns on an assessment of
whether the marriage structure proposed by the plaintiffs will, over time, if
endorsed and supported by the State, prove to be as stable and successful a
model as the one that has formed a cornerstone of our society since colonial
times, or prove to be less than optimal, and result in consequences, perhaps now
unforeseen, adverse to the State's legitimate interest in promoting and
supporting the best possible social structure in which children should be born
and raised. Given the critical importance of civil marriage as an organizing and
stabilizing institution of society, it is eminently rational for the Legislature
to postpone making fundamental changes to it until such time as there is
unanimous scientific evidence, or popular consensus, or both, that such changes
can safely be made. n37
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n37 "The State retains wide latitude to decide the manner in which it will
allocate benefits." Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 652, 417
N.E.2d 387 (1981). To the extent that the Legislature concludes that one form of
social relationship is more optimal than another for the bearing and raising of
children, it is free to promote and support the one and not the other, so long
as its conclusion is rational, and does not discriminatorily burden the exercise
of a fundamental right. Id. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-193, 114 L.
Ed. 2d 233, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) ("Government can, without violating the
Constitution, selectively fund a program to encourage certain activities it
believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problems in another way").
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - [***174]
There is no reason to believe that legislative processes are [*394] inadequate
to effectuate legal changes in response to evolving [**1004] evidence, social
values, and views of fairness on the subject of same-sex relationships. n38
Deliberate consideration of, and incremental responses to rapidly evolving
scientific and social understanding is the norm of the political process -- that
it may seem painfully slow to those who are already persuaded by the arguments
in favor of change is not a sufficient basis to conclude that the processes are
constitutionally infirm. See, e.g., Massachusetts Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of
Educ., 436 Mass. 763, 778, 767 N.E.2d 549 (2002); Mobil Oil v. Attorney Gen.,
361 Mass. 401, 417, 280 N.E.2d 406 (1972) (Legislature may proceed piecemeal in
addressing perceived injustices or problems). The advancement of the rights,
privileges, and protections afforded to homosexual members of our community in
the last three decades has been significant, and there is no reason to believe
that that evolution will not continue. Changes of attitude in the civic, social,
and professional communities have been even more profound. Thirty years ago, The
[***175] Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, the seminal handbook of the
American Psychiatric Association, still listed homosexuality as a mental
disorder. Today, the Massachusetts Psychiatric Society, the American
Psychoanalytic Association, and many other psychiatric, psychological, and
social science organizations have joined in an amicus brief on behalf of the
plaintiffs' cause. A body of experience and evidence has provided the basis for
change, and that body continues to mount. The Legislature is the appropriate
branch, both constitutionally and practically, to consider and respond to it. It
is not enough that we as Justices might be personally of the view that we have
learned enough to decide what is best. So long as the question is at all
debatable, it must be the Legislature that decides. The marriage statute thus
meets the requirements of the [*395] rational basis test. Accord Standhardt v.
Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (marriage statutes rationally
related to State's legitimate interest in encouraging procreation and child
rearing within marriage); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 313, 191 N.W.2d 185
(1971) ("equal protection clause of [***176] the Fourteenth Amendment, like the
due process clause, is not offended by the state's classification of persons
authorized to marry"); Singer v. Hara, 11 Wn. App. 247, 262-263, 522 P.2d 1187
(1974) ("There can be no doubt that there exists a rational basis for the state
to limit the definition of marriage to exclude same-sex relationships").
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n38 Legislatures in many parts of the country continue to consider various means
of affording same-sex couples the types of benefits and legal structures that
married couples enjoy. For example, in 1999 the California Legislature
established the first Statewide domestic partner registry in the nation, and in
each of the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 substantially expanded the rights and
benefits accruing to registered partners. Cal. Fam. Code §§ 297 et seq. (West
Supp. 2003). See also comments of Massachusetts Senate President Robert
Traviglini to the effect that he intends to bring civil union legislation to the
floor of the Senate for a vote. Mass. Senate Eyes Civil Unions: Move Comes as
SJC Mulls Gay Marriages, Boston Globe, Sept. 7, 2003, at A1.
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
D. Conclusion. While "the Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of
personal liberty against government incursion as zealously, and often more so,
than does the Federal Constitution," ante at -, this case is not about
government intrusions into matters of personal liberty. It is not about the
rights of same-sex couples to choose to live together, or to be intimate with
each other, or to adopt and raise children together. It is about whether the
State must endorse and support their choices by changing the institution of
civil marriage to make its benefits, [**1005] obligations, and
responsibilities applicable to them. While the courageous efforts of many have
resulted in increased dignity, rights, and respect for gay and lesbian members
of our community, the issue presented here is a profound one, deeply rooted in
social policy, that must, for now, be the subject of legislative not judicial
action.